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The Unnecessary Doctrine of Necessaries 
More than three centuries ago, the English courts developed the 
doctrine of necessaries1 as a means of enforcing a husband's duty to 
support his wife during an ongoing marriage.2 This rule permitted a 
woman whose husband "improperly refused or neglected to pro-
vide"3 for her to buy her "necessaries"4 on his credit. The vendor 
could collect from the husband on a contract implied by law by dem-
onstrating fulfillment of several conditions.5 But because merchants 
generally could not ascertain at the time of sale that these conditions 
were met, they rarely extended credit on the basis of the necessaries 
doctrine. The necessaries doctrine thus was historically an ineff ec-
tive way of compelling support.6 However, because it has always 
been, and is still, a woman's only legal means of enforcing her hus-
band's support obligation in a continuing marriage,7 the doctrine 
l. Some of the earliest English and American cases are: Manby v. Scott, I Lev. 4, 86 Eng. 
Rep. 781, I Sid. 109 (1659); Lungworthy and Rockmore, 10 Will. 3 (1698), reported al I Ld. 
Raym. 444-45, 91 Eng. Rep. 1196 (1698); Child v. Hardyman, 2 Str. 875, 93 Eng. Rep. 909 
(1731); Bolton v. Prentice, 2 Str. 1214, 93 Eng. Rep. 1136 (1745); and M'Cutchen v. M'Gahay, 
11 Johns. 233 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1814). 
2. H. CLARK, LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS 182 (1968). 
3. J. SCHOULER, DOMESTIC RELATIONS 101 (1895). 
4. "Necessaries" refers to more than articles essential to preserve life. They include items 
that are appropriate to the woman's social position for which the husband has the ability to 
pay. What constitutes a "necessary" is a question of fact. H. CLARK, supra note 2, at 190; J. 
KELLY, CONTRACTS OF MARRIED WOMEN 167 (1882). Thus, a costly dress might be held a 
"necessary" for the wife of a wealthy man, while only a more modest garment would be 
deemed a "necessary" for the wife of a less well-to-do man. 
Examples of items and services that have been held to be necessaries are food (Mihalcoe v. 
Holub, 130 Va. 425, 107 S.E. 704 (1921)), clothing (Feiner v. Boynton, 73 N.J. L. 136, 62 A. 420 
(1905)), shelter (Mihalcoe), medical care (Cooke v. Adams, 183 So.2d 925 (Miss. 1966)), dental 
care (Clark v. Tenneson, 146 Wis. 65, 130 N.W. 895 (1911)), certain legal services (Read v. 
Read, 119 Colo. 278, 202 P.2d 953 (1949)), furniture and household goods (Jordan Marsh Co. 
v. Cohen, 242 Mass. 245, 136 N.E. 350 (1922)), and, in the case of a rich husband, a mink coat 
(Gimbel Bros. v. Pinto, 188 Pa. Super. 72, 145 A.2d 865 (1958)) and whale meat and caviar 
(Bloomingdale Bros. v. Benjamin, 200 Misc. 1108, 112 N.Y.S.2d 33 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1951)). 
5. Generally, the courts have imposed three conditions before granting recovery under the 
doctrine of necessaries: the items purchased must have been "necessaries"; the wife must have 
been cohabiting with the husband at the time of the purchase or have been separated through 
no fault of her own; and the merchant must have relied upon the husband's credit in making 
the purchase. See notes 17-22 i,ifra and accompanying text. 
6. At least one court and many commentators have concluded that uncertainties of collec-
tion discouraged merchants and severely limited the effectiveness of the doctrine in providing 
credit for needy spouses. See Graves v. Graves, 36 Iowa 310, 313 (1873); see also H. CLARK, 
supra note 2, at 191-92; L. WEITZMAN, THE MARRIAGE CONTRACT: SPOUSES, LOVERS AND 
THE LAW 42-43 (1981); Brown, The Duty of the Husband to Support the W(/e, 18 VA. L. REV. 
823, 843-44 (1932); Krauskopf & Thomas, Partnership Marriage: The Solution to an Ineffective 
and Inequitable Law of Support, 35 OHIO ST. L. J. 558, 570-71 (1974); Paulsen, Support Duties 
Between Husbands and Wives, 9 V AND. L. REV. 709, 735-36 (1956); Sayre,A Reconsideration of 
Husband's Duty to Support and Wife's Duty to Render Services, 29 VA. L. REV. 857, 861 (1943). 
7. While the cause of action is given to the merchant, not the wife, the necessaries doctrine 
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survived into this century in both common law and statutory8 forms. 
This venerable rule has been the subject of judicial renovation in 
was intended to function as an indirect self-help remedy for a needy wife. See, e.g., Ewell v. 
State, 207 Md. 288, 114 A.2d 66 (1955). Courts virtually always refuse to enforce the support 
obligation directly, i.e., issue a support decree while the parties live together. See, e.g., Mc-
Guire v. McGuire, 157 Neb. 226, 59 N.W.2d 336 (1953). Clark could name only one case, 
Miller v. Miller, 320 Mich. 43, 30 N.W.2d 509 (1948), where a court ordered support payments 
in an ongoing marriage. H. CLARK, supra note 2, at 186 n.56. 
Courts often cite three major policy reasons for not permitting interspousal litigation over 
support obligations or other family decisions: (1) Reluctance to saddle the judiciary with triv-
ial family disputes, see, e.g., Goode v. Martinis, 58 Wash. 2d 229, 234, 361 P.2d 941, 944 
(1961); H. CLARK,supra note 2, at 186,253, (2) fear of disrupting marital harmony, Thompson 
v. Thompson, 218 U.S. 611, 618 (1910); Rubalcava v. Gisseman, 14 Utah 2d 344, 346, 384 P.2d 
389, 390 (1963); H. CLARK, supra note 2, at 253, and (3) skepticism regarding the social value 
of expending scarce judicial resources on seriously troubled marriages. 
Opening up the judicial system for resolution of everyday family disputes risks swamping 
already overburdened courts with insignificant contests that are best settled elsewhere. The 
Alabama Supreme Court voiced this concern in K.ilgrow v. Kilgrow, 268 Ala. 475, 107 So. 2d 
885 (1959), when it refused to mediate an argument between parents over which school their 
child should attend: "[I]f we should hold that ... [we have] jurisdiction in this case such 
holding will open wide the gates for ijudicial] settlement ... of all sorts and varieties of inti-
mate family disputes . . . ." 268 Ala. at 479, 107 So. 2d at 888. The Ki/grow court's reasoning 
also applies to support issues. Just to settle a quarrel between two stubborn spouses, the courts, 
as Professor Clark points out, "can hardly allow themselves to be drawn into deciding whether 
the family budget will cover the purchase of a car or a television set." H. CLARK, supra note 2, 
at 186. 
The "intervention disrupts marital harmony" argument has two major themes. The first is 
that court proceedings are too adversarial, intrusive, rigidly rule-bound, and clumsy to handle 
so fragile an organism as the family. See Schultz, Contractual Ordering of Marriage: A New 
Mode/far State Policy, 70 CALIF. L. REV, 204, 243 (1982). This criticism could be blunted 
somewhat by treating family disputes in a nonadversarial, mediative manner. But any adjudi-
cation system, especially one that rejects absolute judicial discretion, requires some rules, and 
consequently can never be flexible enough to accommodate the unique aspects of each case. 
The second theme of the argument is that legal intervention often exacerbates the situation it 
was intended to help. Even if courts adopt a mediation approach to family disagreements, 
voluntary resolution will not always be possible, and a court order would be required to settle 
matters. As the Ki/grow court noted in deciding not to intervene in a family quarrel: 
[I]ntervention, rather than preventing or healing a disruption, would quite likely serve as 
the spark to a smoldering fire. A mandatory court decree supporting the position of one 
(spouse] against the other would hardly be a composing situation for the unsuccessful 
(spouse] to be confronted with daily. One spouse could scarcely be expected to entertain a 
tender, affectionate regard for the other spouse who brings him or her under re-
straint. . . . [The judiciary] usually voices the hope that the breach may somehow be 
healed by mutual understanding between the [spouses] themselves. 
268 Ala. at 479-80, 107 So. 2d at 889. Courts have not applied this reasoning to necessaries 
actions, presumably on the assumption that a suit by a third party is less damaging to conjugal 
relations than interspousal litigation. There is no reason to believe, however, that a necessaries 
action by his wife's suppliers would kindle less resentment in the breast of a husband already 
disposed to neglect his wife, than a direct action by the wife. 
Professor Glendon has commented that, "[c]ouples who reach the point of seeking legal 
intervention to settle their disputes ... frequently have reached the point of marriage break-
down." M. GLENDON, STATE, LAW AND FAMILY 127 (1977). Courts doubt that society will 
gain from the expenditure of precious judicial resources on failing marriages. This reasoning 
can be used to argue forcefully against the necessaries doctrine, since a relationship in which 
one spouse refuses the other support will not generate the benefits of individual contentment 
and social harmony that society seeks in promoting marriage. See notes 133-36 infra and 
accompanying text. 
8. California, the District of Columbia, Georgia, Hawaii, Kentucky, Minnesota, Montana, 
Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, and 
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recent years. Recognizing that the social roles of women and mar-
riage have undergone vast changes since the development of the sup-
port and necessaries doctrines, courts in nine states have recently 
revised the necessaries doctrine9 to comport with their conceptions of 
contemporary society or have abolished it entirely. 10 Women in all 
these jurisdictions are now liable for their own necessaries, and in 
several they are responsible for their husbands' as well. In addition, 
states that have "modernized" the necessaries rule have by and large 
abandoned the conditions that made creditor enforcement difficult. 11 
As a result, creditors in these jurisdictions should easily be able to 
obtain a judgment against either spouse for almost all of the expen-
ditures of the other. 
On its surface, the "new necessaries doctrine" seems quite mod-
em and sensible. Many women work today and can help pay for 
their own and their husbands' needs. Also, if creditors are able to 
collect more easily under the new doctrine, one would expect 
merchants to extend credit more willingly, thus making the modem 
necessaries doctrine a more effective support remedy than the old 
one. Looking more closely, though, one must question whether the 
doctrine really accomplishes its goals and whether gender-neutrali-
zation is all this rule of law needs to make it appropriate in the last 
quarter of the twentieth century. Before this ancient doctrine is 
either perpetuated or modified, its premises and effectiveness should 
be examined to determine its modem validity. 
This Note argues that neither the traditional nor the modem 
necessaries doctrines are justifiable in contemporary society. Part I 
investigates the practical effects of both the traditional and contem-
porary necessaries doctrines and demonstrates that neither is an ef-
fective mechanism for providing support to a needy spouse. While a 
more successful support remedy might be devised to replace modem 
and traditional versions of the necessaries rule, Part II shows that yet 
another reformulation would not be worthwhile because the theoret-
ical underpinnings of the doctrine are faulty. There is no persuasive 
Texas have all codified the necessaries doctrine in some form or another. 3 C. VERNIER, 
AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS 47-48 (1935). 
Maryland also had codified it, Md. Ann. Code, art. 45, § 21 (1957, 1982 Rep!. Vol.), but 
both the statute and the common law doctrine were invalidated on state equal rights amend-
ment grounds in Condore v. Prince George's County, 289 Md. 516,425 A.2d 1011 (1981). See 
notes 40-45 infra and accompanying text. 
9. Courts in Florida, Indiana, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, and Wisconsin have 
altered the doctrine of necessaries. For the details of their approaches, see notes 23-36 infra 
and accompanying text. 
10. Courts in Maryland, Pennsylvania and Virginia have abolished the doctrine. See notes 
37-40 infra and accompanying text. 
11. Limitations based upon the non-purchasing spouse's ability to pay and reliance on that 
spouse's credit have been eliminated in most of these states. See notes 52-59 infra and accom-
panying text. 
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evidence to establish the existence of the narrow support problem 
the necessaries rule was designed to alleviate, or of creditors' need 
for extra protection from married debtors, or of the efficacy of the 
doctrine as a means of preserving the .fisc and promoting stable mar-
riages. This failure of the doctrine's underlying assumptions, com-
bined with the significant interest modem couples have in 
structuring their own financial arrangements, argues for abolition of 
the doctrine. Part III suggests that even if the doctrine of necessaries 
is eliminated, a nonspecific, nonenforceable legal support duty 
should be maintained. 
I. THE EFFICACY OF TRADITIONAL AND MODERN NECESSARIES 
DOCTRINES 
The primary purpose of both the traditional and the modern 
necessaries doctrines is to provide support to needy spouses. Neither 
version of the doctrine accomplishes this goal. 
A. The Traditional Necessaries .Doctrine 
The necessaries doctrine is not a self-sufficient rule of law; rather 
it arises from a husband's broader common-law duty to support his 
wife.12 It evolved in an era when married women could neither con-
trol their own property or income, nor make contracts, 13 as a means 
12. H. CLARK, supra note 2, at 181. At common law the wife is under no obligation to 
support her husband. Some states, however, have mutual support statutes, i.e., statutes which 
require husband and wife to support one another. See IDAHO CODE§§ 32-901, 32-915 (1983); 
N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-07-01 (1981) (requiring that "[h)usband and wife contract towards 
each other obligations of mutual respect, fidelity, and support"); Omo REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 3103.01 (Page 1980). While on its face the statutory language imposes symmetrical obliga-
tions on husband and wife, courts have interpreted it in light of the common law tradition, 
holding that a wife's obligation is secondary and is activated only if her husband is incapaci-
tated or destitute. See, e.g., Hagert v. Hagert, 22 N.D. 290, 133 N.W. 1035 (1911); Klump v. 
Klump, 96 Ohio App. 93, 121 N.E.2d 273 (1954); Humphrey & Son v. Huff, 3 Ohio App. 111 
(1914); Labadie v. Henry, 132 Okla. 252, 270 P. 57 (1928). 
Under the common law, the wife's quid pro quo for her husband's support was her obliga-
tion to care for his home and children. H. CLARK, supra note 2, at 18 I. While her household 
services were economically valuable, the husband's monetary contribution was, at least by the 
mid-nineteenth century, considered more important. In reward for this presumed greater obli-
gation, the husband was allotted superior legal power in the marriage. He was ordained head 
of the household and given the right to make all major family decisions, including where they 
lived and how money was spent. See, e.g., N. BASCH, IN THE EYES OF THE LAW: WOMEN, 
MARRIAGE, AND PROPERTY IN NINETEENTH CENTURY NEW YORK 59, 218 (1982); see also id. 
at 219; L. KANOWITZ, WOMEN AND THE LAW 70 (1972); Krauskopf & Thomas.supra note 6, at 
560. But see REEVE, THE LAW OF BARON AND FEMME (1816),citedin N. BASCH,supra, at 57-
59 ("the husband's exclusive responsibility to support the marriage was a consequence of his 
naturally superior power; not a legal consequence of the marriage contract.") 
13. Before the passage of Married Women's Property legislation ( consisting of various acts 
passed by almost all the states between 1839 and 1935) marriage changed a woman from a 
legal entity into a legal cipher. Johnston, Sex and Property: The Common Law Tradition, Tile 
Law School Curriculum, and Developments Toward Equality, 47 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1033, 1046, 
1061 (1972). Commentators from Bracton and Glanvill to Blackstone attributed this transfor-
mation to the teaching of Genesis 2:24 that man and wife are "one flesh." Blackstone explains: 
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by which a needy wife could "secure herself from want against a 
cruel and miserly husband, of ample means to support her."14 The 
By marriage, the husband and wife are one person in law: that is, the very being or legal 
existence of the woman is suspended during the marriage, or at least is incorporated and 
consolidated into that of the husband; under whose wing, protection, and cover, she per-
forms every thing; and is therefore called in our Iaw-french afeme-covert,femina viro co-
operata; is said to be covert-baron, or under the protection and influence of her husband, 
her baron, or lord; and her condition during her marriage is called her coverture. Upon 
this principle, of a union of person in husband and wife, depend almost all the legal 
rights, duties, and disabilities, that either of them acquire by the marriage. 
I W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 441 (Cooley ed. 1884); see also 1 F. POLLOCK & F. 
MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 405-06 (2d ed. 1968); Bradwell V. State, 83 U.S. 
(16 Wall.) 130, 139-42 (1873) (Bradley, J., concurring). 
Coverture stripped a woman of all means of self-support. A wife lost at law, during the 
marriage, her capacity to contract, or to sue or be sued on her own behalf. Her husband 
acquired control over and the right of income from her real property. He could dispose of his 
interest in her lands whenever he pleased, and it could be attached by creditors to satisfy his 
debts. Even her earnings belonged to him. Johnston, supra at I 045-46; Mister, Law ef Married 
Women, 20 AM. L. REV. 356, 362 (1886). 
Propertied women could avoid some of coverture's harsh effects through the ownership of a 
separate estate recognized in equity. A separate "trust" estate could be established for a mar-
ried woman by a capable agent such as her father or husband. Equity permitted her the use of 
and ability to convey or devise this property. She could also sue or be sued in connection with 
it, and pledge it for credit purchases. Furthermore, this property was immune from her hus-
band's creditors. H. CLARK, supra note 2, at 221-22. 
Nonetheless, the co=on law disabilities made self-support difficult. The husband's sup-
port obligation has thus been explained as compensation for his right to her earnings and rents, 
as well as for her legal disability in the co=ercial world. See, e.g., Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 
279 n.9 (1979); Condore v. Prince George's County, 289 Md. 516, 520-21, 425 A.2d IOI I, 1013 
(1981); J. KELLY, supra note 4, at 164; Crozier, Marital Support, 15 B.U. L. REV. 28 (1935); 
Krauskopf & Thomas, supra note 6, at 563; Paulsen, supra note 6, at 709. 
The logic of this rationale could not survive the Married Women's Property Acts, which 
provided, among other things, that women could acquire, own, and dispose of property; that 
their property was not subject to creditors' claims against their husbands; that their rents and 
income were their own; and that they could contract, and sue or be sued. H. CLARK, supra 
note 2, at 223-24. Courts and legislatures declared, however, that this legislation did not allevi-
ate the husband's support duty or his correlative obligation to pay for his wife's necessaries. 
See, e.g., Memorial Hosp. v. Hahaj, 427 Ind. App. 690,430 N.E.2d 412,414 (1982); Condore, 
289 Md. at 522, 425 A.2d at 1014; Act of Mar. 16, 1877, ch. 14 (1875-80), Conn. Acts 21 I, 
amended by CONN. GEN. STAT.§§ 46b-37 (1983); Paulsen, supra note 6, at 710; Krauskopf & 
Thomas, supra note 6, at 563. Consequently, the persistence of the husband's support obliga-
tion past the late nineteenth century depends on other explanations. In the nineteenth century, 
some legal writers ascribed the imposition of the support obligation on the male and the home-
making obligation on the female to certain essential truths about male and female natures. 
See, e.g., Mister,supra, at 363 (Women were believed to require male support because "being 
controlled by sentiment and affection, rather than by reason (as God intended them to be)" 
they were "incapacitated from dealing with men, or even for themselves on any business 
line."); see also R. WIEBE, THE SEGMENTED SOCIETY 58 (1975). In this century, cultural an-
thropologists have tried to explain the division of labor by sex according to differences in 
reproductive function. See, e.g., Murdock, Social Structure, in C. HOWARD & R. SUMMERS, 
LAW: ITS NATURE, FUNCTIONS AND LIMITS 179-80 (1965). The courts have traditionally at-
tributed the legal division of responsibility to the marital status itself. See, e.g., Maynard v. 
Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 21 l (1888); Johnston, supra, at 1048. Other theorists have proposed eco-
nomic explanations for division of labor. See, e.g., G. BECKER, A TREATISE ON THE FAMILY 
14-37 (1981). 
14. J. SCHOULER, supra note 3, at 98; see also Marshfield Clinic v. Discher, 105 Wis. 2d 
506, 510-11, 314 N.W.2d 326, 328-29 (1982) ("The heart of[the necessaries doctrine) is a con-
cern for the support and the sustenance of the family and the individual members 
thereof. . . . [It) encourages the extension of credit to those who in an individual capacity 
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necessaries doctrine was intended to enable her to purchase neces-
sary items on credit. 15 Theoretically, a merchant would be induced 
to sell to a necessitous married woman on the knowledge that, 
should her husband refuse to pay, under agency principles16 the law 
would imply a contract between the wife's supplier and her husband. 
However, because the necessaries doctrine imposed substantial 
may not have the ability to make these basic purchases. In this manner it facilitates the sup• 
port of the family unit .... "); 105 Wis.2d at 524, 314 N.W.2d at 335 (Abrahamson, J., dis-
senting) ("Protecting needy spouses is the objective of the marital duty of support and the 
doctrine of necessaries was developed to aid enforcement of that objective."). 
15. There are three other, statutory, "support remedies," all of which have as their primary 
purpose protection of third parties from economic harm due to a husband's failure to support 
his wife. They are: relative responsibility statutes (see, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. 
§§ 40l.l, 401.3-401.9 (1976 and Supp. 1983-84)), criminal non-support laws (see, e.g., ALA. 
CODE§ 13A-13-4 (1975 & 1982 Supp.)), and family expense statutes (see, e.g., CONN. GEN. 
STAT. ANN. § 46b-37 (West Supp. 1983-84)). 
Solicitude for the public purse prompted adoption of relative responsibility and criminal 
non-support laws. The former, derived from seventeenth-century Elizabethan poor laws, cre-
ate an obligation to provide for certain impecunious relatives. Krauskopf & Thomas, supra 
note 6, at 572-73. In practice, these laws typically are used only by public welfare agencies to 
recover minimal amounts expended for an impoverished person's sustenance and health. M. 
GLENDON, THE NEW FAMILY AND THE NEW PROPERTY 49-50 (1981); Krauskopf & Thomas, 
supra note 6, at 572-73. These statutes have not been employed to enforce a wife's common-
law right of support. Krauskopf & Thomas, supra note 6, at 573. 
Neither have, generally speaking, the laws that criminalize non-support of a wife. Most of 
these statutes require desertion or abandonment in addition to non-support and are thus inap-
plicable to an ongoing marriage. Furthermore, many insist that the wife be destitute, i.e., not 
supplied with the bare essentials of life by anyone, before the husband can be found guilty. 
Krauskopf & Thomas, supra note 6, at 573. But see H. CLARK, supra note 2, at 202 (''The fact 
that a friend or relative steps in with help does not excuse the husband from criminal liabil-
ity."). 
Concern that Married Women's Property Acts, which removed a wife's property from the 
reach of her husband's creditors, would disadvantage creditors spurred enactment of family 
expense statutes. See, e.g., Gabriel v. Mullen, 111 Mo. 119, 122-23, 19 S.W. 1099, 1100 (1892); 
C. VERNIER,supra note 8, at 104; Crozier,supra note 13, at 47-48; Krauskopf & Thomas,supra 
note 6, at 571; Mister,supra note 13, at 360-61. These laws gave creditors access to the separate 
assets of husband and wife whenever the debt was a "family expense." Twenty-three jurisdic-
tions enacted legislation of this sort. C. VERNIER, supra note 8, at 102. A typical statute might 
state: "The expense of the family and of the education of the children shall be chargeable 
upon the property of both husband and wife, or of either of them, in favor of creditors there-
fore, and in relation thereto they may be sued jointly or separately." ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 68, 
§ 15 (Smith-Hurd 1959). 
The rationale for the woman's liability under family expense statutes presumably was that 
it was unfair to husbands and children for propertied wives, who before the Married Women's 
legislation had in fact helped support their families with their assets, to renege on this support. 
See, e.g., I J. BISHOP, LAW OF MARRIED WOMEN 684 (1875); MILLER, LECTURES ON THE 
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 173, cited in Pound, Individual Interests in the Domestic Relations, 14 
MICH. L. REV. 177, 192 (1916) (''The husband is deprived of all control of his wife's property; 
but, strange to say, while he is bound to maintain his wife and children, no corresponding 
obligation is laid upon her."). 
Like relative responsibility and criminal non-support statutes, family expense statutes were 
designed to protect third parties, not to enforce common-law support rights. Krauskopf & 
Thomas, supra note 6, at 572. Any benefit to the wife from the operation of these three types 
of laws was fortuitous, rather than intentional. 
16. Before passage of Married Women's Property legislation, a married woman making a 
credit purchase was generally assumed to be acting as her husband's agent. See, e.g., H. 
CLARK, supra note 2, at 189. 
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limitations on the husband's liability, it seems never to have been an 
effective support mechanism.17 Since the creditor's claim depended 
17. Why the law chose to limit the husband's liability to the detriment of the wife's support 
remedy may be explained as an amalgam of protection against abuse, reaffirmation of male 
dominance in marriage, and defense against a wife's infidelity or selfishness. 
The limitation based on the family social position and the husband's ability to pay 
stemmed in large part from fear of a wife's extravagant spending. This restriction shielded a 
hapless husband from his wife's improvident purchases, reflecting a social policy that, as be-
tween the husband and the merchant, the husband deserved more protection from the spend-
thrift wife. Caveat venditor! See, e.g., N. BASCH, supra note 12, at 143 (The nineteenth century 
frequently stereotyped women as "luxury-loving" wives who "financially enslaved" their hus-
bands); J. BISHOP, supra note 15, at 680; 3 A. CALHOUN, A SOCIAL HISTORY OF THE AMERI-
CAN FAMILY 120-21 (1960) (1st ed. 1919) ("The revolution in woman's world has not ... 
eliminated pernicious parasitism . . . . Many parasitic wives still ruin men by their senseless 
demands[,] • . . pursu[ing] reckless expenditures."). 
The limitation also reinforced male direction of family life. The man determined his fam-
ily's standard of living not only through his ability to pay but also through his preferences. A 
wealthy man could eschew luxury for ascetism and thus set his wife's support entitlement at a 
penurious level. See, e.g., J. KELLY,supra note 4, at 168 ("the wife has authority to pledge her 
husband's credit for necessaries, ... suitable to the style in which the husband lives") (empha-
sis added). Courts enforced these private "sumptuary laws" by rejecting merchants' claims for 
"necessaries" that exceeded a family's lifestyle. 
The cohabitation requirement was designed to insure that the husband was treated fairly. 
By wrongfully deserting him, the wife destroyed the contractual quid pro quo of his support 
duty-her household services - as well as the moral basis of his obligation, her fidelity. See, 
e.g., N. BASCH,supra note 12, at 228. Equity demanded the husband's release from responsi-
bility. But in addition to guarding some innocent husbands against irresponsible or adulterous 
wives, this limitation surely must have deterred women from leaving seriously troubled mar-
riages for fear their departures would be adjudged abandonment, leaving them with no means 
of support. See, e.g., J. KELLY, supra note 4, at 173 ("if the wife leaves her husband without 
sufficient cause ... she cannot bind him by her contract [for necessaries]"; moreover, a "mar-
ried woman's elopement accompanied with adultery, or her adultery causing separation, will 
discharge the husband from all obligation to furnish her with necessaries"). 
Importance of reliance on the husband's credit increased substantially after enactment of 
Married Women's Property Acts. (Before the Acts, there was an inquiry into whose credit was 
pledged only when the wife held a separate equitable estate and allegedly pledged that estate. 
See note 13 supra.) After enactment, women could pledge their own credit and husbands were 
no longer liable for their wives' contractual obligations. See, e.g., Maryland's Married Wo-
men's Acts in Maryland Code (codified at Mo. ANN. CooE art. 45, §§ 1-21 (1982)). But at the 
same time, a husband's obligation to support his wife and pay for her necessaries continued 
unabated. See, e.g., Mo. ANN. CooE art. 45, § 21 (1982). These conflicting principles were 
resolved by holding the husband responsible for his wife's necessaries unless she expressly or in 
fact bound her own estate to pay for them, in which case he was absolved of all liability. See J. 
KELLY, supra note 4, at 171 and cases cited therein at nn. 5-6. 
One suspects that this "whose-credit-was-pledged" limitation reflected a judicial conviction 
either that propertied women should contribute to their own support or that the separate assets 
of each spouse should be shielded from the creditors of the other, in order to preserve a source 
of family support. The former explanation parallels the legislative response to the Married 
Women's Property Act denying husbands' use of their wives' property for family support -
i.e., family expense statutes. Using the "whose-credit-was-pledged" limitation, courts could 
require at least those women who arguably relied on their own assets to provide for them-
selves, instead of allowing them to conserve their property at their husbands' expense. The 
latter explanation, preservation of a source of family support by insulating the husband's assets 
from his wife's creditors, is the mirror image of one of the major purposes of the Married 
Women's Property legislation - insulation of the wife's assets from her husband's creditors. 
See, e.g., Mister, supra note 13, at 364 ("it has been the leading and predominant purpose of 
[the Married Women's Property Acts] to protect the property of married women, both as against 
their husbands and their husband's creditors") (emphasis in original); Jackson v. Hubbard, 36 
Conn. 10, 15 (1869). 
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on the fulfillment of several conditions - the purchased item had to 
be a "necessary," defined by the family's social position and limited 
by the husband's ability to pay, 18 the wife had to be cohabiting with 
her spouse or living apart through no fault of her own when the sale 
occurred, 19 and the creditor had to rely on the husband's, not the 
wife's, credit20 - it was very difficult to know, before going to court, 
whether the doctrine of necessaries would apply.21 Consequently, 
few merchants offered credit on this basis. As the Iowa Supreme 
Court noted in 1873: 
The wife may find it difficult, if not impossible, to obtain a continuous 
support in this way, since dealers and professional men would be un-
willing to supply their articles or services if thus compelled to litigation 
in order to secure their pay. Here then is a plain legal duty of the 
husband for the violation of which no adequate remedy . . . can be 
had .... 22 
Thus, the traditional necessaries doctrine failed in its primary pur-
pose - effective provision of marital support. 
B. The Modern Necessaries .Doctrine 
Courts in Florida, New Jersey and Wisconsin have taken the lead 
18. H. CLARK, supra note 2, at 190; J. KELLY, supra note 4, at 167. Also, if the husband 
has already supplied his wife with adequate necessaries he has discharged his marital obliga-
tion and will not be held liable for her additional purchases under the doctrine of necessaries. 
For example, ifhe provides her with clothing in quantity and quality appropriate to her social 
standing and his ability to pay and she charges another dress, he will not be responsible. J, 
KELLY, supra note 4, at 168. 
Similarly, he need only pay but once for her necessaries. If he gives her money to buy 
clothes and she spends it on something else and then charges some clothing, the husband owes 
the merchant nothing under the necessaries doctrine. See, e.g., Saks v. Huddleston, 36 F.2d 
S37 (D.C. Cir. 1929); Saks & Co. v. Bennett, 12 N.J. Super. 316, 79 A.2d 479 (19S1); 
Wanamaker v. Weaver, 176 N.Y. 7S, 68 N.E. 13S (1903); H. CLARK, supra note 2, at 191. 
19. This is a "corollary of the usual principle that a husband owes no duty of support to a 
wife who has wrongfully deserted him." H. CLARK, supra note 2, at 191; see also Manby v. 
Scott, I Lev. 4, 86 Eng. Rep. 781 (16S9); Lungworthy and Hockmore, 10 Will. 3 (1698) re-
ported at l Ld. Raym. 444-4S, 91 Eng. Rep. 1196 (1699); Child v. Hardyman, 2 Str, 87S, 93 
Eng. Rep. 909 (1731); M'Cutchen v. M'Gahay, II Johns. 233 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1814). For more 
recent American cases on the point see Holiday Hosp. Assn. v. Schwarz, 166 So. 2d 493 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1964); Kerner v. Eastern Dispensary & Casualty Hosp., 210 Md. 37S, 123 A.2d 
333 (1956). Where the wife is living apart by reason of the husband's fault, she may buy neces-
saries at his expense. See, e.g., D. H. Holmes Co. v. Huth, 49 So. 2d 875 (La. Ct. App. 1951); 
Nicholas v. Bickford, 44 N.M. 210, 100 P.2d 906 (1940); Manufacturers Trust Co. v. Gray, 278 
N.Y. 380, 16 N.E.2d 373 (1938); Hunt v. Hayes, 64 Vt. 89, 23 A. 920 (1891). Other cases are 
cited in Annot., 60 A.L.R.2d 7, 31 (19S8). 
20. See, e.g., Alexander v. Duffee-Freeman Furniture, 52 Ga. App. 244, 183 S.E. 86 (1935); 
Mathews Furniture v. La Bella, 44 So. 2d 160 (La. Ct. App. 1950); Pritchard v. Bigger, 288 
Mich. 447,285 N.W. 17 (1939); Saks & Co. v. Barrett, 109 N.J.L. 42, 160 A. 40S (1932); Wick-
strom v. Peck, 179 A.D. 85S, 167 N.Y.S. 408 (N.Y. App. Div. 1917); Tille v. Finley, 126 Ohio 
St. S78, 186 N.E. 448 (1933); Heym v. Juhasz, 68 N.E.2d 119 (Ohio Ct. App. 1943). Other 
cases are cited in Annot., 27 A.L.R. S54, S54-55 (1923) and 60 A.L.R.2d 7, 23 (1958). But some 
cases do not follow this rule. See Annot., 60 A.L.R.2d 7, 23 (1958). 
21. H. CLARK, supra note 2, at 190. 
22. Graves v. Graves, 36 Iowa 310, 313 (1873). 
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in re-evaluating and expanding the traditional doctrine of neces-
saries. The changes made by these courts ensure easier creditor sat-
isfaction of debts but fail to make the doctrine of necessaries a more 
effective source of support for needy spouses. The highest courts of 
Maryland and Virginia, by contrast, have abolished the doctrine. 
1. The Contours of the Modern .Doctrine 
a. Extension of liability to the w!fe. All of the courts that have 
addressed the question of the necessaries doctrine's contemporary 
validity have held, either by modernizing the necessaries doctrine or 
by abolishing it, that wives are to some degree responsible for their 
own credit purchases. 
The Wisconsin Supreme Court simply modified sex-based liabil-
ity. The Wisconsin rule provides that a husband is primarily liable 
for his own and his wife's necessaries, but should he have insufficient 
resources to pay for both their needs, his wife assumes secondary 
liability.23 The court justified this formula through its perception of 
the average married woman's economic situation: today most mar-
ried women earn wages,24 therefore it is fair to require them to con-
tribute to their own and their mates' support. However, the court 
concluded that because most women still earn less than their hus-
bands, it would be inequitable to impose comparable support bur-
dens on both spouses.25 
In contrast, the New Jersey Supreme Court, believing gender-
based liability for necessaries to be both unconstitutional26 and un-
justifiable in an era when many married women work,27 revised its 
23. The Wisconsin Supreme Court developed this rule through a series of three cases: 
Sharpe Furniture v. Buckstaff, 99 Wis. 2d 114, 299 N.W.2d 219 (1980); Estate of Stromsted v. 
St. Michael Hosp. of Franciscan Sisters, 99 Wis. 2d 136, 299 N.W.2d 226 (1980), and Marsh-
field Clinic v. Discher, 105 Wis. 2d 506, 314 N.W.2d 326 (1982). In Sharpe, the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court affirmed the modern relevance of the necessaries doctrine and held that a 
husband may be liable for necessary items bought by his wife on credit. In Stromsted, it 
extended limited liability to the woman for her own necessaries, holding her secondarily liable. 
In Marslifield Clinic, it took the final step, and held a wife secondarily responsible for her 
husband's necessaries. For further discussion of these cases, see notes 90-105 i,!fra and accom-
panying text. 
24. The Wisconsin Supreme Court took judicial notice of the increasing participation of 
women in the work force. During the 1970s, despite two serious recessions, the number of 
working women rose on the average by one million a year. Research Summaries, BUREAU OF 
LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, MONTHLY LAB. REV. 46 {Aug. 1982). By 1981, 52% 
of the female population and 51% percent of all married women worked. Research Summa-
ries, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, MONTHLY LAB. REV. 47, 53-54 
(May 1982) [hereinafter cited as May 1982 MONTHLY LAB. REY.]. 
25. Marshfield Clinic v. Discher, 105 Wis. 2d 506, 512-13, 314 N.W.2d 326, 329-30 (1982). 
26. Jersey Shore Medical Center-Fitken Hosp. v. Estate of Baum, 84 N.J. 137, 148, 417 
A.2d 1003, 1008-09 (1980). The facts of Jersey Shore are related in detail in the text accompa-
nying notes 98-103 i,!fra. 
27. Jersey Shore Medical Center-Fitken Hosp. v. Estate of Baum, 84 N.J. 137, 148-49, 417 
A.2d 1003, 1008-09 (1980). 
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necessaries rule to impose primary liability on the purchasing spouse 
for his or her necessaries, and secondary liability on the other 
mate.28 This secondary responsibility is activated only if the spouse 
who incurred the debt cannot pay it.29 
The New Jersey court derived its formula for liability from two 
assumptions. First, although many married women do not work, 
and, of those who do, most earn less than their husbands, women as 
a class have made such substantial economic progress that imposi-
tion of some liability implied by law for their own and their hus-
bands' necessaries is justified.30 Second, even though spouses legally 
own their incomes and assets separately,31 most married couples in 
fact function as economic units. The court extrapolated from this 
observation that marital partners' reasonable expectations "are that 
their income and assets are held for the benefit of the marital part-
nership and, incidentally, for creditors who provide necessaries for 
either spouse."32 
Two Florida Courts of Appeals33 modified the necessaries doc-
trine to impose joint and several liability on each spouse for the 
other's necessaries.34 Reasons offered for this change were women's 
improved economic position35 and the marital status itself.36 
State equal rights amendments mandating gender-neutral laws 
induced courts in Maryland, Virginia and Pennsylvania37 to abolish 
28. The Indiana Court of Appeals also has adopted this rule. Memorial Hosp. v. Hahaj, 
429 Ind. App. 690, 430 N.E.2d 412 (1982). The facts of Hahaj are related in the text accompa-
nying notes 93-96 infra. 
29. Jersey Shore Medical Center-Fitken Hosp. v. Estate of Baum, 84 N.J. 137, 148, 417 
A.2d 1003, 1008-09 (1980). 
30. Jersey Shore Medical Center-Fitken Hosp. v. Estate of Baum, 84 N.J. 137, 147-49, 417 
A.2d 1003, 1008-09 (1980). 
31. See note 118 infra and accompanying text. 
32. Jersey Shore Medical Center-Pitkin Hosp. v. Estate of Baum, 84 N.J. 137, 151, 417 
A.2d 1003, 1010 (1980). For criticism of the court's marriage-as-a-financial-partnership anal-
ogy, see notes 117-29 infra and accompanying text. 
33. Parkway General Hosp. v. Stem, 400 So. 2d 166 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (recovery of 
medical expenses of husband permitted from wife); Manatee Convalescent Center v. McDon-
ald, 392 So. 2d 1356 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (wife held liable for necessaries of husband). 
34. The Supreme Court of Tennessee and a lower court in Pennsylvania have adopted the 
Florida approach. See Kilbourne v. Hanzelik, 648 S.W.2d 932 (Tenn. 1983); Albert Einstein 
Medical Center v. Gold, 66 Pa. D. & C.2d 347 (1974) (adoption of sex-neutral approach 
prompted by state equal rights amendment). For further discussion of these cases, see notes 96 
& 103 infra. 
35. Manatee Convalescent Center v. McDonald, 392 So. 2d 1356, 1358 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1980) ("Even handed treatment of the sexes in the modem market place must also carry the 
burden of responsibility which goes with the benefits."). 
36. Parkway General Hosp. v. Stem, 400 So. 2d 166, 167 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) ("Our 
holding is that a wife is liable for her husband's bills simply and solely because of the marital 
relationship between them."). 
37. The highest courts of Maryland and Virginia and a lower court in Pennsylvania have 
abolished the doctrine. See Condore v. Prince George's County, 289 Md. 516, 425 A.2d 1011 
(1981); Schilling v. Bedford County Memorial Hosp., - Va.-, 303 S.E.2d 905 (1983); Albert 
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the necessaries doctrine. An amendment making illegal any use of 
sex to determine the legal rights and responsibilities of men and wo-
men is clearly inconsistent with a doctrine granting all women a sup-
port right and all men a support responsibility.38 Rather than alter 
the doctrine of necessaries to make it gender-neutral, these courts 
abolished it.39 Abolition leaves each spouse solely liable for his or 
her own necessaries.40 
The modem reformulations of the necessaries doctrine have in 
common two major flaws that are avoided by abolition. First, they 
make nonworking wives - in 1981 forty-nine percent of all wives 
living with their husbands41 - liable for their husbands' necessaries 
without an economically sound basis for doing so.42 Second, the 
modem doctrines prevent couples from freely structuring their own 
Einstein Medical Center v. Nathans, 27 Pa. Fiduc. 561 (1977), revd. on other grounds, 5 Pa. D. 
& C.3d 619 (1978). 
38. A typical Equal Rights Amendment states that "[e]quality of rights under the law shall 
not be abridged or denied because of sex." Mo. CONST., Declaration of Rights, art. 46 (1978). 
39. The Maryland court found that alteration of the doctrine had some merit but refused 
to do so out of deference to the legislature. Between 1973 and 1978, the Maryland legislature 
had considered, and declined to enact, several bills to remove sex discrimination from the 
doctrine of necessaries. Rather than act where the legislature chose not to, Maryland's Court 
of Appeals abolished the necessaries rule altogether. See Condore v. Prince George's County, 
289 Md. 516, 530-31, 425 A.2d lOll, 1018-19. The Virginia Supreme Court was motivated by 
similar considerations. See Schilling v. Bedford County Memorial Hosp., - Va. -, 303 
S.E.2d 905 (1983). 
In contrast, a Pennsylvania lower court abolished the doctrine of necessaries for a some-
what different reason. Imposition of reciprocal marital status-based liability was, in the court's 
opinion, a step for the legislature rather than the judiciary, because it constituted "such a 
radical departure from the underlying reasons and implicit assumption upon which the duties 
were based at co=on law." Albert Einstein Medical Center v. Nathans, 27 Pa. Fiduc. 561, 
564 (1977), revd. on other grounds, 5 Pa. D. & C. 619 (1978). 
40. See, e.g., Condore v. Prince George's County, 289 Md. 516, 532-33, 425 A.2d lOll, 
1019 (1981). 
41. See note 24supra. 
42. In holding women liable for their husbands' expenses, the courts that developed the 
modem necessaries doctrine tacitly imposed on wives the legal duty to support their husbands. 
These courts did so without establishing any economic justification for the imposition. 
It is true that women, as a class, are increasingly economically independent. Over half of 
all women living with their husbands are employed outside the home. May 1982 MONTHLY 
LAB. REV., supra note 24, at 54. As married women increasingly contribute to their families' 
support, their husbands grow more and more dependent on them. The result of dual earner 
marriages is an economic interdependence that arguably justifies both continuance and expan-
sion of the marital support obligation. See, e.g., Jersey Shore Medical Center-Fitkin Hosp. v. 
Baum, 84 N.J. 137, 147, 417 A.2d 1003, 1008 ("Interdependence is the hallmark of a modem 
marriage. The co=on law rule imposing liability on husbands, but not on wives, is an 
anachronism that no longer fits our contemporary society."). 
For many women, however, dependence is still a reality. As of 1981, 49% of all wives 
living with their husbands were unemployed. May 1982 MONTHLY LAB. REv., supra note 24, 
at 54. And those wives who do work generally earn far less than their husbands. Id. at 55 (as 
of 1981, women earned an average of only 60% of men's wages). Rather than lending support 
to the proposition that wives should be liable for their husband's necessaries, these economic 
facts arguably mandate ~bolition of the doctrine. If the current economic position of women 
defies class-wide characterization, it makes little sense to impose, through the necessaries doc-
trine, a single characterization on all women. See notes 145-51 i1!fra and accompanying text. 
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:financial arrangements. Wisconsin's modified necessaries doctrine 
essentially forces the husband into the role of primary earner, while 
New Jersey's doctrine limits, with regard to creditors, the ability of 
couples to structure marital obligations along traditional lines.43 
Both fail to recognize the multiplicity of modern marital support 
arrangements. 44 
Furthermore, Wisconsin's necessaries law is, like the traditional 
doctrine, probably unconstitutional.4S In Orr v. Orr,46 the United 
States Supreme Court invalidated on equal protection grounds a 
statute that required husbands, but not wives, to pay alimony. Using 
an intermediate level of scrutiny,47 the Court held that although the 
legislative purpose - help for "needy spouses" - was an important 
governmental objective, there was no justification for using sex as a 
proxy for need when individualized hearings to ascertain need were 
already part of the procedure for awarding alimony.48 Similarly, the 
Wisconsin and traditional necessaries rules have aid for needy 
spouses as their primary purpose49 and require individual hearings 
to determine liability.so By analogy to Orr, this use of sex as a proxy 
for need appears to be unconstitutional.SI 
b. Restriction of the "whose-credit-was-pledged" limitation. 
Under the traditional necessaries doctrine, a husband was liable for 
his wife's necessaries only if the creditor relied on the husband's, 
rather than the wife's, credit.s2 This limitation on liability effectively 
perished in the Wisconsins3 and New Jerseys4 renovations of the 
43. See notes 137-44 infra and accompanying text. 
44. See, e.g., Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142 (1980). 
45. See Schilling v. Bedford County Memorial Hosp., - Va.-, 303 S.E.2d 905 (1983) 
(finding the traditional doctrine unconstitutional); see also Note, Inequality in Marital Liabili-
ties: The Need far Equal Protection When Modiftying the Necessaries /Joctrine, 11 U. MICH. J. 
L. REF. 43 (1983). 
46. 440 U.S. 268 (1979). 
47. "'[C]lassifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives and must 
be substantially related to achievement of those objectives.'" 440 U.S. at 279 (1978) (quoting 
Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 316-17 (1977)). 
48. 440 U.S. at 280-81. 
49. See note 14supra. 
50. Liability under the necessaries doctrine is not automatic. The merchant must bring suit 
to collect on this basis. 
51. In Marshfield Clinic v. Discher, 105 Wis. 2d 506,314 N.W. 2d 326 (1982), the majority 
held that its revised necessaries rule did not violate constitutional equal protection require-
ments, apparently on the ground that sex is a reliable proxy for need. 105 Wis. 2d at 509-10, 
314 N.W.2d at 328. The dissent, however, argued that the rule was unconstitutional for the 
reasons explained in the text accompanying notes 45-51 supra. 105 Wis. 2d at 526-27, 314 
N.W.2d at 336 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting). 
52. See notes 5 & 20 supra and accompanying text. 
53. Wisconsin preserved the limitation in so dilute a version that it is, for all practical 
purposes, nonexistent. Under the traditional doctrine, if the creditor agreed to look to spouse 
B for payment for his purchases, the creditor could not collect from spouse A on the basis of 
the necessaries doctrine. As a result of the Wisconsin court's alteration of the doctrine, the 
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doctrine. The modem necessaries rule imposes liability on spouse A 
for spouse B's purchases, regardless of spouse B's promise to pay for 
them. 
c. Lessened importance of ability to pay. One other traditional 
restriction on a spouse's liability for his mate's purchases seems to be 
disappearing from the modem necessaries rule - ability to pay. 
Under the old doctrine, a necessary was defined by the husband's 
ability to pay. If a wife's expenditure exceeded the family's standard 
of living, the purchased good or service was held not to be a neces-
sary, and the husband was released from any liability based on the 
necessaries doctrine.55 Modem courts, by contrast, have virtually 
abandoned individualized inquiry into ability to pay in determining 
what constitutes a necessary. Instead, judges primarily rely on pre-
cedent (for example, medical expenses are necessaries in the case at 
hand because previous cases have held them to be necessaries)56 and 
on a tacit but clearly apparent conviction that the purchased item 
should be deemed a necessary because creditors deserve to be paid.57 
In eliminating ability to pay as a definitional element of a neces-
sary, courts have undermined the traditional doctrine's safeguards 
against abuse (such as unconscionable extravagance on the part of 
the defaulting spouse) and family financial disaster. The new rule 
may protect a spouse somewhat against catastrophic liability if it 
takes ability to pay into account in determining extent of liability. 
However, recent cases do not clearly indicate whether legal liability 
is absolute or limited by the financial resources of the non-purchas-
ing spouse. A decision by a federal court in Pennsylvania suggests 
that liability cannot exceed reasonable ability to pay,58 but the New 
creditor can collect from spouse A unless he "expressly agreed to look only to [spouse .BJ for 
payment." Marshfield Clinic v. Discher, 105 Wis. 2d 506, 509, 314 N.W.2d 326, 328 (1982) 
(emphasis added). The new rule is certain to result in expanded liability for spouse A. For 
further comments on this revision, see 105 Wis. 2d at 519-21, 314 N.W.2d at 333-34 (Abraham-
son, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
54. The New Jersey Supreme Court clearly, though sub silentio, abolished this limitation: 
''We hold that both spouses are liable for the necessary expenses incurred by either 
spouse . . . . A creditor providing necessaries to one spouse can assume that the financial 
resources of both spouses are available for payment .... The imposition of liability based on 
marital status alone is ... justifiable .... " Jersey Shore Medical Center-Fitkin Hosp. v. 
Estate of Baum, 84 N.J. 137, 151, 417 A.2d 1003, 1010 (1980). 
55. See note 18 supra and accompanying text. 
56. See, e.g., Manatee Convalescent Center v. McDonald, 392 So. 2d 1356, 1357 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 1980) (citing Correll v. Elkins, 195 So.2d 27 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967) and Holiday 
Hosp. Assn. v. Schwartz, 166 So. 2d 493 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1964) for the proposition that 
"medical expenses fall clearly within [the) category of [necessaries]"). 
57. Concern for creditors' rights is particularly apparent in Sharpe Furniture v. Buckstaff, 
99 Wis. 2d 114, 299 N.W.2d 219 (1980), and Jersey Shore Medical Center-Fitkin Hosp. v. 
Estate of Baum, 84 N.J. 137, 417 A.2d 1003 (1980). 
58. United States v. O'Neill, 478 F.Supp. 852, 854 (E.D. Pa. 1979) ("A wife can be liable 
for the costs of necessaries provided to her husband so long as it is shown she is capable of 
bearing the financial burden."). 
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Jersey Supreme Court seems inclined to a harsh rule of total 
liability.59 
2. The Modern .Doctrine's Efficacy 
The three salient features of the modem necessaries doctrine -
liability of the wife, restriction of the "whose-credit-was-pledged" 
limitation, and the lessened importance of ability to pay in defining 
necessaries - seem, on the surface, to solve the problem of creditors' 
reluctance to sell on the basis of the doctrine. The modernizing 
courts have clearly made it easier for creditors to collect, therefore 
one would expect the contemporary doctrine to be a more successful 
support remedy than its predecessor. A careful examination of the 
necessaries doctrine in the context of the Equal Credit Opportunity 
Act (ECOA)60 and modem credit practices, however, suggests the 
contrary. The modem doctrine seems to result in less available 
credit for needy spouses. 
Congress intended to ease access to credit for creditworthy61 
members of several classes previously discriminated against, 62 in-
59. Jersey Shore Medical Center-Fitkin Hosp. v. Estate of Baum, 84 N.J. 137, 141, 417 
A.2d 1003, 1005 ("If[the] financial resources (of the spouse who incurred the debt] are insuffi-
cient, the creditor may then seek satisfaction from the income and property of the other 
spouse."). 
Although the Jersey Shore court gave its new rule prospective application, thus freeing the 
instant defendant, Mrs. Baum, from liability for the costs of her husband's last illness (see text 
accompanying notes 98-103 infra for facts of case), the potential harshness of the rule may be 
illustrated by considering how it would have affected Mrs. Baum had it been applied retroac-
tively. She would have lost all of her equity (subject presumably to some state homestead 
exemption) in her only asset, her home, which she had owned in tenancy by the entirety with 
her deceased husband. This severe result would circumvent the legislative purpose behind ten-
ancy by the entirety - protection of the surviving spouse from his or her dead mate's credi-
tors. See Huber, Creditors' Rights in Tenancies by the Entireties, 1 B.C. INous. & CoM. L. REV. 
197, 205-07 (1960). Requiring a widow to divest herself of all her financial resources, leaving 
virtually nothing for her should she need it later, seems very unfair. The problem of exorbi-
tant medical costs is a societal one which should be dealt with in a coherent, society-wide 
fashion that provides reasonable economic protection for both the health care industry and the 
sick, not through the doctrine of necessaries. See text accompanying notes 84-86 infra for 
discussion of the relationship of the necessaries doctrine to larger social problems such as high 
costs of medical care, unemployment, etc. 
60. 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (1982). The dissents in both Condore v. Prince George's County, 289 
Md. 516, 542-43, 425 A.2d 1011, 1024-25 (1981) (Rodowsky, J., dissenting), and Marshfield 
Clinic v. Discher, 105 Wis. 2d 506, 521 n.6, 314 N.W.2d 326, 334 n.6 (1982) (Abrahamson, J., 
dissenting in part and concurring in part), suggest that the impact of the federal Equal Credit 
Opportunity Act should be taken into account in formulating a new necessaries doctrine. 
61. See, e.g., Equal Credit Opportunity Act Amendments of 1976, S. REP. No. 589, 94th 
Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1976) [hereinafter cited as S. REP. No. 589], reprinted in 1976 U.S. CooE 
CONG. & Ao. NEWS 403 ("No credit applicant shall be denied the credit he or she needs and 
wants on the basis of characteristics that have nothing to do with his or her creditworthiness."); 
Economic Problems of Women, Hearings Before the Joint Economic Comm., 93d Cong., 1st 
Sess. 457 (1973) (Report of Morrigene Holcomb, "Equal Credit Legislation in the 93rd Con-
gress, Analysis of the Major Bills") ("It is not the purpose of this Title to require any creditor 
... to extend credit to any person ... not deemed creditworthy."). 
62. ECOA prohibits discrimination: 
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eluding married women,63 through passage of ECOA.64 Under 
ECOA and its rules, Regulation B,65 a creditor considering applica-
tions for individual, unsecured credit may not ask the applicant's 
marital status.66 However, should the creditor discover the status in-
directly, he may take account of state domestic relations and prop-
erty laws that affect the rights and remedies of creditors, including 
necessaries laws, in deciding whether or not to grant credit. 67 If an 
(1) on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, sex or marital status, or age (pro-
vided the applicant has the capacity to contract); 
(2) because all or part of the applicant's income derives from any public assistance pro-
gram; or 
(3) because the applicant has in good faith exercised any right under [the ECOA]. 
15 U.S.C. § 169l(a)(l982). 
63. Examples of discrimination against married women include: 
(1) Requiring a newly married woman to reapply for credit, usually in her husband's 
name, even though her creditworthiness has otherwise remained the same. 
(2) Refusing to extend credit to a married woman in her own name, even though she 
would be deemed creditworthy if unmarried. 
(3) Refusal to count the wife's income when a married couple applies for credit. 
See S. REP. No. 278, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1973) [hereinafter cited as S. REP. No. 278); 
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON CONSUMER FINANCE, CONSUMER CREDIT IN THE UNITED STATES 
152-53 (1972). 
64. ECOA, as amended, applies to all credit transactions, save a few limited exceptions for 
business, public utilities, securities, incidental, and government credit. 15 U.S.C. §§ 169l(b), 
I69I(c)(l982); see S. REP. No. 589, supra note 61, at 2; 12 C.F.R. § 202.3 (1983). 
The act defines "creditor'' as "any person who regularly extends, renews, or continues 
credit; any person who regularly arranges for the extension, renewal, or continuation of credit; 
or any assignee of an original creditor who participates in the decision to extend, renew, or 
continue credit." 15 U.S.C. § 169la(e) (1982). This means that the limitations on creditors 
discussed in the text at notes 65-70 infra will be in effect for almost all credit transactions in 
which an individual consumer would engage. 
One noteworthy exception, however, is incidental credit, which is granted the following 
pertinent exemptions from Regulation B, 12 C.F.R. §§ 202.1-202.13 (1983): the creditor may 
ask about the applicant's marital status, 12 C.F.R. 202.3(d)(2) (1983), and may request the 
signature of a spouse even if the applicant is creditworthy. 12 C.F.R. 202.3(d)(5)(1983). Inci-
dental credit is defined as credit other than that extended by a public utility or securities bro-
ker: (1) that is not made pursuant to a credit card account, (2) on which no finance charge is 
imposed, and (3) that is not payable by agreement in more than four installments. 12 C.F.R. 
§ 202.3(a)(3) (1983). A co=on example of credit that might be held "incidental" is that 
extended by a doctor or hospital. See INTERNATIONAL CONSUMER CREDIT Assoc., WHAT 
CREDITORS SHOULD KNOW ABOUT REVISED REGULATION B 38 (1977) [hereinafter referred to 
as WHAT CREDITORS SHOULD KNOW]. 
65. 12 C.F.R. §§ 202.1-202.13 (1983). 
66. 12 C.F.R. 202.5(d)(l) (1983). According to the Federal Reserve Board's official com-
ments: "Creditors should note that this informational bar applies notwithstanding the exist-
ence of a state necessaries law or family expense statute." 42 Fed. Reg. 1245 (1977). 
The Board's statement was needed to clarify the relationship between 12 C.F.R. 202.S(d) 
(1983) and 15 U.S.C. § 1691(b)(l) which states: 
It shall not constitute discrimination (b) ... for a creditor - (1) to make an inquiry of 
marital status if such inquiry of marital status is for the purpose of ascertaining creditor's 
rights and remedies applicable to the particular extension of credit and not to discriminate 
in a determination of creditworthiness . . . . 
61. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 169l(b)(l), 169ld(b) (1982); 12 C.F.R. §§ 202.6(b)(l) n.8, 202.6(c) 
(1983). 
It should be noted that ECOA does not preempt state necessaries laws. See 42 Fed Reg. 
1250 (1977); WHAT CREDITORS SHOULD KNOW, supra note 64, at 45; Maltz & Miller, The 
Equal Credit Opportunity Act and Regulation B, 31 OK.LA. L. REV. 1, 17-18 (1978). There may, 
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individual is creditworthy in her own right, the creditor may not in-
sist upon a guarantor.68 However, if the applicant must rely on an-
other person's income in order to qualify for credit, the creditor may 
require the income provider to assume contractual liability for the 
account.69 In the case of joint accounts the creditor may also require 
all authorized users to become co-obligors.70 
ECOA71 decreases the necessaries doctrine's effectiveness in pro-
viding credit to needy spouses. An independently creditworthy mar-
ried woman applying for an individual account will receive it on the 
basis of her own credit merits, not the necessaries doctrine. The 
creditor may not inquire about her marital status, but even if he in-
advertently discovers it, his primary reason for granting her credit 
would be her own ability to pay.72 By contrast, the case of a wife 
with no independent resources presents two different possibilities. In 
the first, and probably the most common one, her husband will sup-
ply her needs. In the other, the one for which the necessaries doc-
trine was created, her husband will refuse to support her. In either 
instance the wife must rely on her husband's income in her credit 
application.73 Prudent creditors would, and could under ECOA, re-
quire the husband's signature. This would be no problem for the 
woman with the willing spouse, but the one with a recalcitrant mate 
would be left without credit. 
Of course, the creditor, instead of requiring her husband's con-
tractual liability, could consider his obligation under the necessaries 
doctrine and grant her credit solely on that basis. As the congres-
sional hearings on ECOA revealed, creditors do take account of state 
support laws in establishing credit policies,74 however, it seems they 
are more concerned with the effect of support liability than with the 
however, be one exception for the case where state law prohibits separate extension of con• 
sumer credit to husband and wife from the same creditor. In these instances the prohibitive 
state law is preempted and, in that situation, each party to the marriage is solely responsible 
for the debt contracted. See 15 u.s.c. § 1691d(d) (1982). Bui see WHAT CREDITORS SHOULD 
KNow, supra note 64, at 45. 
68. 12 C.F.R. § 202.7(d)(I) (1983). 
69. 12 C.F.R. § 202.7(d)(5) n.10 (1983). 
70. BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, ANNUAL REPORT TO THE 
CONGRESS ON THE EQUAL CREDIT OPPORTUNITY ACT FOR THE YEAR 1979, at 13 (1980). 
71. Based on co=on experience and the few studies that have been undertaken, it ap-
pears that ECOA generally has been successful in easing access of married women to credit. 
The Act has been less successful in regard to other discriminated-against groups. Ladd, Equal 
Credit Opportunity: Women and Mortgage Credit, AM. EcoN. REV., May 1982, at 166, 170. 
72. Creditors prefer to extend credit on the basis of the contracting party's ability to pay 
rather than on that party's support rights. See notes 74-75 infra and accompanying text. 
73. The discussion here refers solely to applications for unsecured credit. In the instance 
of a resourceless spouse applying for secured credit, relying on her mate's or jointly-owned 
property, she may be required to obtain her spouse's signature. 12 C.F.R. § 202.7(d)(4)(1983). 
14. See, e.g., Credit JJiscrimination, Hearings Before the House Subcomm. on Consumer Af-
fairs of the Comm. on Banking and Currency on H.R. 14856 and H.R. 14908, 93d Cong., 2d 
Sess. I (1973), (statement of Leonor K. Sullivan, chairman of Subcomm. on Consumer Af-
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effect of support rights .75 In other words, many merchants, in deter-
mining creditworthiness under the traditional doctrine, considered 
the husband's responsibility for his wife's necessaries to be a signifi-
cant negative factor in his credit application, and the wife's right to 
support to be only a minimally positive factor in hers. Conse-
quently, the modem (gender-neutral) necessaries doctrine may harm 
a marginally creditworthy spouse. Creditors will give little weight to 
a needy wife's support right, yet will be wary of her potential liability 
for her husband's purchases, and thus will be more reluctant than 
ever to give her credit.76 Thus it seems that the modem necessaries 
doctrine will result in the restriction of credit for needy spouses -
the very antithesis of its goal. 
II. ASSUMPTIONS UNDERLYING THE TRADITIONAL AND MODERN 
NECESSARIES DOCTRINES 
Neither the traditional nor the modem formulation accomplishes 
the necessaries doctrine's primary goal - provision of support to 
needy spouses. One possible response to this failure is to continue 
fine-tuning the doctrine until it does induce creditors to sell to neces-
sitous married people. Before taking this course, however, the basic 
premises of this ancient doctrine should be examined in light of 
modem conditions. 
Part II investigates the major assumptions on which the neces-
saries rule is based and concludes that the nature of demonstrated 
support problems in ongoing marriages, creditor interests, and State 
interests do not justify the doctrine's continuation. Furthermore, 
married couples have a powerful interest in structuring their own 
financial relations that outweighs any residual value the doctrine of 
necessaries may have. 
A. Significance and 'Jype of Support Problems in Ongoing 
Marriages 
The underlying purpose of the necessaries doctrine is quite lim-
ited: to provide for spouses in continuing marriages who are needy 
because their mates refuse to support them. The interpretations 
courts give to "needy" and "refusal to support," however, raise ques-
tions as to whether the doctrine addresses a socially significant sup-
fairs); id at 475 (statement on behalf of the International Consumer Credit Association); see 
also R. CLONTZ, EQUAL CREDIT OPPORTUNITY MANUAL, 14-15, A-10, D-45-57 (1976). 
75. R. CLONTZ, supra note 74, at 14-15, A-10, D-45-47. 
76. Instances can be imagined in which the support right would be given more weight than 
the potential liability. If, for example, a needy wife is married to a wealthy husband, creditors 
would be unlikely to worry about her potential liability and likely to give great weight to her 
support right. This type of case appears to be so rare as to be an unimportant exception to the 
general rule. See notes 74-75 supra & 77-89 infta and accompanying text. 
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port problem that warrants government intrusion into private 
relationships. Recent litigation suggests that, in fact, the necessaries 
doctrine is used not to remedy serious marital support problems, but 
rather to give creditors another means of collecting debts.77 
The traditional necessaries doctrine defined a needy spouse as 
one whose mate failed to provide her with goods and services appro-
priate to the family's standard of living. This standard was deter-
mined by the husband's preferences and ability to pay.78 Thus, a 
wealthy woman might be deemed "needy" if she lacked caviar,79 a 
poor one if she lacked gruel. Such disparate interpretations of need, 
although in accord with legal convention, are, in the real world, un-
conscionable. A sturgeon-deficient diet cannot be taken seriously 
either as an indicator of need or as adequate justification for State 
intervention in the marital relationship. To rationalize intervention 
in the name of spousal support, say to provide a well-clad husband 
with yet another suit, or a "neglected" wife with a color TV to re-
place her black-and-white set, belittles the real problems of spouses 
who have inadequate food, clothing and shelter; intrudes paternalis-
tically on private adult relationships; and squanders judicial re-
sources that would be better spent on more credible social 
problems.80 However, a less strained, colloquial interpretation of 
"needy" - for example, "[d]istressed by want of the means of liv-
ing";81 - accords with the doctrine's original intent82 and would al-
77. It is important to distinguish between the use of the necessaries doctrine by creditors as 
a basis for extending credit and as a ground for recovery in case of default. The former use 
requires reliance on the doctrine in making the decision to extend credit, and thus serves the 
doctrine's primary purpose, making credit available to needy spouses. The latter use functions 
merely as an after-the-fact creditor's remedy. 
Lawrence Friedman's system of analysis may be helpful here. He argues that when we say 
a law fails or succeeds in its purposes, we are "measuring . . . how well behavior conforms to 
some purpose or goal .... (A] law can 'fail' even when the subjects comply literally with its 
directions or make full use of it, if the purpose is not fulfilled." L. FRIEDMAN, THE LEGAL 
SYSTEM, 48-49 (1975). He goes on to distinguish between the direct and indirect goals ofa law. 
The direct goal is the precise behavior commanded or allowed - what the law tells one to do. 
The underlying point or aim - what the law hopes to accomplish - is the indi~ect goal. id. 
at 48-50. Under his framework, the "direct goal" of the traditional necessaries doctrine is 
recovery by the merchant from the husband on an implied contract. The "indirect goal," or 
underlying purpose, is to make credit easily available to needy women as a means of enforcing 
their husbands' duty to support. If, as this Note suggests, the traditional necessaries doctrine is 
effective only in regard to the "direct goal,'' providing a creditor's remedy when default occurs, 
and does not encourage merchants to extend credit, it fails its purpose. 
78. See note 17 supra and accompanying text. 
79. Bloomingdale Bros. v. Benjamin, 200 Misc. I 108, 1109, 112 N.Y.S.2d 33, 35 (N.Y. City 
Ct. 1951). 
80. See note 7 supra. 
81. WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1637 (2d 
ed. 1960). 
82. In Manby v. Scott, 1 Sid. 109, 82 Eng. Rep. 1000 (1659), the court was concerned that a 
wife be preserved against being stripped on each ungrounded suspicion, and of being starved 
on each wanton displeasure of her husband. ("Et per eel meanes le feme serra preserve de! 
esteant stript sur chescun causelesse suspicion, & del esteant starved sur chescun wilfull dis-
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low the law to focus on significant support problems. Such need, if 
proven to be remediable by the necessaries doctrine, would provide a 
more acceptable basis for legal intervention. This analysis uses and 
advocates the colloquial definition of need. 83 
The necessaries doctrine was intended to alleviate only the need 
caused by the refusal or failure of a capable spouse to support his 
mate. As Schouler explained in his nineteenth-century treatise on 
domestic relations, the doctrine permits a wife to "secure herself 
from want against a cruel and miserly husband, of ample means to 
support her."84 The situation where one spouse will not provide ade-
quately for his mate is distinct from that where he cannot. An eff ec-
tive necessaries doctrine could assist the necessitous spouse in the 
former circumstance because the supporting spouse can pay credi-
tors. But where the supporting spouse is himself needy, no formula-
tion of the doctrine will entice merchants to extend credit for 
necessaries. This "cannot provide" dilemma belongs to a much 
larger system of society-wide problems - including unemployment, 
poverty, inflation, disease, old age, lack of education, and exorbitant 
medical costs - that are unrelated to marital status. There is much 
evidence that families suffer severely from need caused by these so-
cial problems.85 Evidence of the narrow type of need addressed by 
the necessaries doctrine is, however, scanty. It seems not to have 
attracted widespread public attention, nor to have been the subject 
pleasure de sa baron.") 1 Sid. at 114, 82 Eng. Rep. at 1003; see also Sillery v. Fagan, 120 N.J. 
Super. 416, 419, 294 A.2d 624, 626 (1972). 
83. There may be commentators who would oppose lowering the legal measure of "need," 
especially for women. Their objection would be that homemaking spouses provide economi-
cally valuable services, which free the earner-spouse to work outside the home for a wage. 
Homemakers thus deserve to share fully in the monetary rewards their efforts help produce. 
This objection to equating legal need with true lack of adequate provisions for life confuses 
two issues - spousal support and marital property ownership. Homemakers' contributions to 
the marital unit do deserve legal recognition, and revision of separate marital property owner-
ship is the best vehicle for doing so. The homemaking spouse has earned a right to share in her 
husband's income and assets through her labor. This right should accrue automatically and 
should be easily enforceable. This could be accomplished most directly through reform of 
marital property law. For example, each mate could be granted a clearly defined interest in 
the earnings and assets of the other, and a cause of action to enforce that interest could be 
created. This particular reform suggestion was made almost twenty years ago by the REPORT 
OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE STATUS OF AMERICAN WOMEN 47 (1963); accord 
TASK FORCE ON FAMILY LAW AND POLICY, REPORT TO THE CITIZEN'S ADVISORY ON THE 
STATUS OF WOMEN 2-3 (1968). The policy has been cited with approval by commentators. 
See, e.g., L. KANOWITZ, supra note 12, at 61 ("The effectuation of such a policy . . . is emi-
nently sound in the light of modem views of the marital relationship .... "). 
But even after ownership reform, a spouse may have needs that he cannot provide from his 
own resources. Support is the most useful tool for dealing with this situation. This analysis, 
therefore, distinguishes between earned rights of equitable ownership and those support rights 
that exist because of need. 
84. J. SCHOULER, supra note 3, at 98. 
85. Daily newspapers testify to the harsh impact on families of unemployment, poverty 
and skyrocketing medical costs. See also NATIONAL INST. FOR ADVANCED STUDIES, WHITE 
HOUSE CONFERENCE OF FAMILIES, NATIONAL HEARINGS SUMMARY (1980). 
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of much sociological research.86 Unfortunately, courts generally 
have not distinguished carefully between these two types of need, 
and have thus burdened the necessaries doctrine with the impossible 
task of resolving large-scale economic problems on an individual 
basis.87 
Furthermore, the facts of some recent, typical necessaries litiga-
tion,88 which are detailed below, indicate that most recorded neces-
saries disputes either are not about significant "will-not-provide" 
support problems or are not about support in ongoing marriages.89 
This suggests either that malicious or neglectful "will-not-provide" 
spouses are rare or that, if they exist in any meaningful number, 
their mates are not benefitting from the necessaries doctrine. The 
results of these cases imply that the necessaries doctrine's actual 
function has become the vindication of creditors' rights. 
For example, necessaries cases often appear not to involve real 
need or a significant lack of support at all. Sharpe Furniture, Inc. v. 
Buckstajf,90 illustratively, concerned a spousal feud over the control 
of family finances. Mr. Buckstaff, a reasonably well-to-do man, tired 
of his wife's lavish spending, and informed her and the local credit 
bureau that he would no longer be responsible for her expenditures. 
Undaunted, Mrs. Buckstaff ordered an expensive couch from 
Sharpe. The sofa was ensconced in the Buckstaff home, but Mr. 
Buckstaff refused to pay for it. There was no allegation that Mrs. 
86. One such study, noted by Schultz, supra note 7, at 234 n.87, has been found: Young, 
.Distribution of Income Within the Family, 3 BRIT. J. OF Soc. 305 (1952) (suggesting that during 
the first half of this century certain groups of British laborers did not increase their families' 
living allowances as either prices or their wages increased.) See also A. WOHL, ENDANGERED 
LIVES: PUBLIC HEALTH IN VICTORIAN BRITAIN 52 (1983). A search of the Social Sciences 
Index of the topics "Family" and "Support" from April 1949 through the present revealed no 
other pertinent publications. 
87. Not only does the necessaries doctrine not address the "cannot provide" dilemma, it is 
not an appropriate means of doing so. These problems strike both married and single people, 
and are of such magnitude that an effective solution to them must be spread across society, 
without regard to marital status. 
88. Of the recent necessaries cases, Sharpe Furniture v. Buckstalf, 99 Wis. 2d 114, 299 
N.W.2d 219 (1980), Memorial Hosp. v. Hahaj, 429 Ind. App. 690,430 N.E.2d 412 (1982), and 
Jersey Shore Medical Center-Fitkin Hosp. v. Baum, 84 N.J. 137, 417 A.2d 1003 (1980), were 
selected for discussion in the text as paradigmatic examples of situations not involving support 
in on-going marriages which seem to prompt necessaries litigation with some frequency: 
spousal financial feuds, post-divorce revenge, death and immense medical care costs 
respectively. 
89. Prof. Clark suggests that cases where a husband consistently fails or refuses to support 
his wife at a level clearly within his means are "extremely rare." H. CLARK, supra note 2, at 
186. 
Professor Paulsen remarks "The rules of support mirror the norms of married life. This 
points up a source of trouble. Almost none of the litigation raising questions of support duties 
involve couples living together in the ordinary way." Paulsen, supra note 6, at 719. 
For an economic argument supporting the predominance of altruism in the family, see G. 
BECKER, supra note 13, at 172-201. 
90. 99 Wis. 2d 114, 299 N.W.2d 219 (1980). 
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Buckstaff actually "needed" this couch, or anything else. The court 
simply reasoned that this sofa was an appropriate piece of furniture 
for a family of the Buckstafl's socio-economic position, and that it 
was therefore a necessary. 
Here there was no issue of actual marital nonsupport.91 What 
really disquieted the court was the possibility that a family quarrel 
might interfere with a creditor's rights.92 But this creditor's problem 
could have been handled through more direct and appropriate 
means than a spousal support remedy. Mr. Buckstaff could have 
been found liable on a quasi-contract, unjust enrichment theory -
after all, he enjoyed the couch in his home. Furthermore, Sharpe 
Furniture could have easily prevented this situation by requiring the 
person they expected to pay for the couch to sign for it. 
The Buckstaff-style marital squabble seems to have degenerated 
into a post-divorce vendetta in the Indiana case, Memorial Hospital 
v. Hahaj.93 Diana Leslie Hahaj incurred a bill of $52.50 for medical 
services while married to Floyd Leslie. She refused to pay, claiming 
that under the traditional doctrine of necessaries her ex-husband 
Leslie was liable for the debt.94 The facts here imply revenge,95 
rather than a need for support, as Ms. Hahaj's motivation. More-
over, the litigation took place after divorce and not in an ongoing 
marriage.96 
Similarly, despite the necessaries doctrine's intended application 
91. The parties to the litigation stipulated that "Mr. Buckstaffhas always provided his wife 
with the necessaries of life and has never failed or refused to provide her with items which 
would constitute necessaries." 99 Wis. 2d at 120, 299 N.W.2d at 223. The court went on to 
state that this stipulation was not dispositive as to the need for the sofa at issue. 99 Wis. 2d at 
122-23, 299 N.W.2d at 224. Nevertheless, the stipulation is significant evidence of the fact that 
in this case the necessaries doctrine was not used to attack a significant support problem. 
92. The court does not say this explicitly. However, its cursory consideration of whether 
the sofa was a necessary implies that provision of necessaries to Mrs. Buckstaff was not its 
primary concern. See 99 Wis. 2d at 123, 299 N.W.2d at 224. In that discussion, the court 
relied almost completely on the fact that the sofa had been used by the family to show that it 
was a necessary. It is hard to imagine any product purchased by a spouse not satisfying this 
test. 
93. 430 N.E.2d 412 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982). 
94. The court rejected this argument and instead adopted the rule set down in Jersey Shore 
Medical Center-Fitkin Hosp. v. Baum, 84 N.J. 137,417 A.2d 1003 (1980): "The spouse incur-
ring the medical expenses, whether husband or wife, is primarily liable for those expenses. If 
the property of that spouse should prove insufficient, then the financial resources of the marital 
relationship is [sic] secondarily liable for those expenses." 430 N.E.2d at 416 (footnote 
omitted). 
95. Because the facts of this case are quite sketchy it is not possible to know Diana Hahaj's 
motivation with certainty. The facts available do support the inference that revenge was her 
motive: she was no longer married to Floyd at the time of the litigation (an ex-husband seems 
an obvious object of revenge); the hospital bill was not large; and the trial court's findings 
made no mention of her inability to pay, thus raising the possibility that she was capable of 
paying but did not want to for other reasons. Even if revenge was not the motive in this 
particular case, the facts here demonstrate that the necessaries doctrine is an easy outlet for 
revenge, a perversion of the doctrine's purposes. 
96. Other cases which do not appear to involve a true lack of support include United States 
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to support problems in continuing marriages, litigation commonly 
arises on the death of a spouse.97 In Jersey Shore Medical Center-
Fitkin Hospital v. Baum ,98 Mr. Baum died in the hospital after a long 
illness, leaving an immense bill- $25,709.50 - and no estate. His 
only asset was his home (worth a little less than the hospital bill), 
which he had owned in tenancy by the entirety with his wife. The 
hospital therefore could not reach it to satisfy his account. While 
this result may seem harsh on the hospital, it promotes one of the 
primary functions of tenancy by the entirety - protection of a sur-
viving spouse from her deceased mate's creditors.99 The new neces-
saries rule promulgated in Jersey Shore - that "both spouses are 
v. O'Neill, 478 F.Supp. 852 (E.D. Pa. 1979), and Albert Einstein Medical Center v. Gold, 66 
Pa. D. & C.2d 347 (1977). · 
O'Neill involved Sally and Alfred O'Neill, who were married in November of 1977. In 
October 1978, Alfred was indicted for crimes alleged to have occurred prior to the marriage. 
Alfred declared himself indigent and counsel was appointed to defend him. Sally refused to 
pay her husband's counsel fees even though they lived together as husband and wife through-
out the course of the proceedings. The court eventually held that Sally was responsible under 
the necessaries doctrine. 
The case gives no suggestion that Alfred was the victim of a serious lack of support. There 
is no reason to believe that Sally would not have hired a defense attorney for her husband if 
the government had not. The government, in seeking reimbursement for the attorney's fees, 
took on the characteristics of the typical creditor in necessaries litigation: it used the doctrine 
as an alternative means of collecting a debt. The main function of the doctrine in this case was 
to assure payment for the government's services. 
The facts of Gold are quite sketchy. The only fact revealed by the opinion was that the 
medical center demanded payment from both husband and wife for the cost of medical ser-
vices rendered the husband. Given that at the time this case was brought, the doctrine had not 
been applied to enforce a woman's support obligation to her husband by Pennsylvania courts, 
and that the hospital brought suit against both husband and wife, it is probable that the doc-
trine was used by a creditor in a desperate search for a source of payment after the services had 
been provided. If this is the case, the doctrine served the spouse only indirectly. Facts as 
vague as those presented in O'Neill and Gold are, of course, susceptible to different interpreta-
tions; nevertheless, neither case appears to have involved the direct use of the necessaries doc-
trine to attack a serious support problem. 
97. Other cases in which death prompted use of the necessaries doctrine include Condore 
v. Prince George's County, 289 Md. 516,425 A.2d 1011 (1981) (hospital sued wife for deceased 
husband's expenses not covered by insurance; necessaries doctrine declared invalid) and 
Marshfield Clinic v. Discher, 105 Wis. 2d 506,314 N.W.2d 326 (1982) (clinic sued wife for cost 
of services rendered deceased husband; wife held secondarily liable). 
Death also spurred use of the doctrine in Estate ofStromsted v. St. Michael Hosp. of Fran-
ciscan Sisters, 99 Wis. 2d 114, 299 N.W.2d 219 (1980), in which manipulation of the neces-
saries doctrine is particularly clear. Mrs. Stromsted was admitted to St. Michael Hospital in 
1978. At the time of her first admission, she executed an authorization for treatment. On her 
second admission, Mrs. Stromsted was pronounced dead on arrival. Neither she nor her hus-
band expressly agreed to pay the charges. The hospital sued her estate to recover its claim for 
services. The estate objected to the claim on the ground that the decedent's husband, not her 
estate, was liable for her necessary medical expenses. There was no claim that the estate could 
not pay the debt. Thus, the doctrine was invoked not to remedy a support problem but to 
avoid liability on the part of the wife's estate. The court eventually held that creditors must 
seek satisfaction of debts for married women's necessary expenses first from their husbands. If 
the husband's assets are insufficient, they may seek satisfaction from the wife or her estate. 
98. 84 N.J. 137, 417 A.2d 1003 (1980). 
99. See Huber, supra note 59, at 205-07. 
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liable for the necessary expenses incurred by either spouse"100 -
permits creditors to circumvent this statutory protection. 
Again one suspects that what disturbed the Jersey Shore court 
was not a "will-not-provide" spousal support problem, but creditors' 
rights, which the court apparently believed to be unduly restricted by 
tenancies by the entirety. 101 This creditors' problem would be more 
appropriately addressed legislatively and directly, rather than 
through a judicially-fashioned spousal support remedy. If the New 
Jersey legislature now believes that creditors deserve more protec-
tion than surviving spouses, it could abolish tenancy by the entirety 
in favor of tenancy in common, and thus allow creditors access to the 
debtor's portion of the property. A simpler solution was available in 
the instant case: the hospital could have protected itself by insisting 
at the time of Mr. Baum's admission that both he and Mrs. Baum 
assume contractual liability for his medical expenses. There is a sup-
port problem in Jersey Shore, 102 but, properly considered, it takes 
the form of the society-wide dilemma of exorbitant medical costs 
rather than the narrower problem of spousal support.103 
Recent cases104 thus suggest that support for spouses who have 
real needs because their mates refuse, rather than are unable, to pro-
vide adequately for them is seldom an issue in" necessaries litiga-
tion.105 Neither the traditional nor modem necessaries doctrines 
seem to be used to alleviate the narrow problem for which they were 
100. 84 N.J. at 151, 417 A.2d at 1010. 
101. No specific statement of the court's concern for creditors appears in the opinion. The 
fact that the court revised the doctrine in a manner detrimental to the integrity of tenancies by 
the entirety without even discussing the effect of the change on this form of ownership indi-
cates that, at a minimum, the spouse is not the focus of the court's approach. Indeed, destruc-
tion of a tenancy by the entirety in order to pay a creditor appears to make the creditor the 
focus of the court's approach. 
102. 84 N.J. 137, 417 A.2d 1003. 
103. Kilbourne v. Hanzelik, 648 S.W.2d 932 (Tenn. 1983), also poses the social problem of 
exorbitant medical costs. Linda Kilbourne appealed a lower court's dismissal of her suit to 
recover $50,000 in hospital and doctor bills incurred by her husband as a result of car accident 
injuries. The lower court dismissed on grounds that a wife is not liable for her husband's 
necessaries. The Tennessee Supreme Court adopted a sex-neutral burden of support in this 
case and remanded to the trial court for trial on the merits. 
104. Other recent necessaries cases either do not provide enough facts to tell if support is 
really at issue or invalidate the doctrine without discussion of the facts in question. See Park-
way General Hosp. v. Stem, 400 So. 2d 166 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (facts lacking); Manatee 
Convalescent Center v. McDonald, 392 So. 2d 1356 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (facts lacking); 
Albert Einstein Medical Center v. Nathans, 27 Pa. Fiduc. 561 (1977), revd. on other grounds, 5 
Pa. D. & C.3d 619 (Pa. 1978) (doctrine invalidated); Schilling v. Bedford County Memorial 
Hosp., - Va.-, 303 S.E.2d 905 (1983) (doctrine invalidated). 
105. The infamous case of McGuire v. McGuire, 157 Neb. 226, 59 N.W.2d 336 (1953), 
while a direct (and consequently unsuccessful) action for support in an ongoing marriage, 
rather than a necessaries case, does suggest that there are some wives whose husbands are 
unconscionably stingy. But despite the noteworthy lack of modem amenities in the McGuire's 
farmhouse, Mrs. McGuire did receive adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care from 
her husband. She thus was not "needy" in the sense used here - without reasonable means of 
subsistence. 
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designed (which may indicate the problem is minimal), nor can they 
correct in any coherent and equitable way, broader economic wel-
fare problems. The doctrine of necessaries therefore could be abol-
ished without harm to significant numbers of needy spouses. 
B. Creditors' Interests in the .Doctrine of Necessaries 
The courts that have modernized the necessaries doctrine appear 
to have done so out of concern for the creditors of married people. 
There is, however, no evidence that creditors require greater protec-
tion against married, as opposed to single, debtors. 
The necessaries doctrine furnishes creditors, by law rather than 
by the agreement of the parties, access to an extra pocket when a 
purchasing spouse defaults. There are two possible explanations for 
this extraordinary solicitude toward the creditors of married people. 
The first is that courts created this additional collection source solely 
to induce merchants to extend credit to needy and independently 
uncreditworthy spouses. Under this rationale, the necessaries doc-
trine could be abolished without affecting creditors' inherent, legiti-
mate interests. The second explanation is that creditors are so much 
more vulnerable with regard to married debtors than single ones that 
they deserve this supplementary protection, whether or not the 
necessaries doctrine actually provides spousal support. Although the 
rhetoric of most courts focuses on support as the raison d'etre of the 
necessaries rule, 106 judicial action increasingly reflects a belief that 
creditors have an independent claim on the doctrine. 
It is not immediately apparent, though, that courts correctly as-
sume creditors suffer a disadvantage in dealing with married people. 
Most creditors from whom Americans borrow today have tremen-
dous financial and sophisticated legal resources to draw upon. Are 
there plausible reasons that Shell Oil or MasterCard, for example, 
cannot protect themselves as well against married credit card holders 
as single ones? Or is there something in the nature of marriage that 
justifies giving creditors a boon? These questions are analyzed be-
low in the context of four arguments that have been made to justify 
different treatment for married and single debtors. 
1. Access to Person with Ability lo Pay 
In Jersey Shore Medical Center-Fitkin Hospital v. Baum, 101 the 
New Jersey Supreme Court rejected independent liability for mar-
ried people with respect to their necessaries because it believed that 
106. See, e.g., Sharpe Furniture v. Buckstaff, 99 Wis. 2d 114, 119, 299 N.W.2d 219, 222 
(1980); Marshfield Clinic v. Discher, 105 Wis. 2d 506, 510-11, 314 N.W.2d 326, 328-29 (1982); 
if. Jersey Shore Medical Center-Fitkm Hosp. v. Baum, 84 N.J. 317, 417 A.2d 1003 (1980) 
(court focuses on creditors' rights). 
107. 84 N.J. 137, 417 A.2d 1003 (1980). 
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it would "leave creditors of a dependent spouse without recourse to 
the only realistic source of payment, the financially independent 
spouse."108 This is not true. Creditors can easily shield themselves 
from this situation. First, a merchant or provider of services does 
not have to give credit. If he thinks the purchaser is a poor credit 
risk, he can demand cash payment. Second, a creditor can limit the 
amount of individual credit to the debtor's independent ability to re-
pay. This is precisely how creditors treat single debtors. Third, if a 
creditor wants to accommodate a married customer's request for 
credit exceeding his independent ability to repay, the creditor may, 
under ECOA, insist on the contractual liability of both spouses.109 
For fullest protection a creditor should insist on clear, written con-
tracts with all debtors. 110 But if he fails to do so, the creditor may 
still attempt to prove in court the existence of an express oral or an 
implied-in-fact contract with the purchasing spouse and/or his mate. 
Finally, if he cannot demonstrate a contract, the creditor may be 
able to collect on quasi-contract principles by showing that either 
spouse benefited unjustly from the extension of credit. 
2. Mutual Benefit Theory 
The New Jersey court also suggested that status-based liability is 
legitimate because "[a] necessary expense incurred by one spouse 
benefits both."111 But if the nonpurchasing spouse enjoys actual 
benefit from his mate's acquisition, as Mr. Buckstaff did from the 
sofa in Sharpe, 112 the creditor does not need the necessaries doctrine. 
Again, he can collect under the equitable doctrine of unjust 
enrichment. 
3. Fraudulent Tranefer Rationale 
Creditors sometimes rely on property rather than income as a 
basis for granting credit. The fraudulent transfer argument urges 
that creditors are at great risk of fraudulent interfamilial conveyance 
when dealing with married people. This is a serious credit problem, 
but creditors can resolve it directly, without resort to the necessaries 
108. 84 N.J. at 149, 417 A.2d at 1009. 
109. See note 69 supra and accompanying text. 
110. In Estate of Stromsted v. St. Michael Hosp. of Franciscan Sisters, 99 Wis. 2d 136, 299 
N.W.2d 226 (1980), the dissent noted that "[i]t is the creditor's neglect which is remedied by 
the court in this case, not the neglect of one marital partner in the Stromsted marriage to 
support the family. In the instant case and in Sharpe the creditor failed to obtain either the 
wife's or the husband's express written or oral promise to pay for the goods or services. The 
creditor could have protected itse!f by preparing its writ/en documents in proper form." 99 Wis. 
2d at 149, 299 N.W.2d at 232-33 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
111. Jersey Shore Medical Center-Fitkin Hosp. v. Baum, 84 N.J. 137, 149, 417 A.2d 1003, 
1009 (1980). 
112. Sharpe Furniture, Inc. v. Buckstaff, 99 Wis. 2d 114, 299 N.W.2d 219 (1980). 
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doctrine. First, the creditor can strengthen his position by securing 
his interest.113 Second, should an illegal conveyance occur, the credi-
tor has available both common law114 and statutory11s causes of ac-
tion against his defrauders. 116 
4. Marriage as Commercial Partnership 
The New Jersey court also justified the necessaries doctrine's ex-
tra protection of creditors by arguing: marriage resembles a commer-
cial partnership; creditors may rely on the assets of all business 
partners; therefore creditors may rely on the assets of both 
spouses. 117 This syllogistic reasoning undermines separate ownership 
of property and depends on an inapt comparison of marriage and 
business partnerships. 
Marital property is owned separately in most states, including 
New Jersey. 118 This means neither spouse has a legal interest in the 
income or assets of the other. The New Jersey rule transforms the 
status of marital property with respect to creditors from separately 
owned to, in practical effect, communally owned. 119 This ad hoc sys-
tem of "community property" treats spouses unfairly by imposing on 
them a liability of this form of ownership, responsibility for each 
other's debts, without granting them any of the benefits, such as a 
legal share in one another's incomes.12° Changes in marital property 
ownership have widespread ramifications. The legislative process, 
which would permit global consideration of marital property owner-
113. Creditors in almost all states may avail themselves of the UNIFORM COMMERCIAL 
CODE'S provisions regarding secured interests in article 9. See U.C.C. §§ 9-101 to 9-507 
(1981). 
114. See w. HAWKLAND & P. LOISEAUX, CASES AND MATERIALS ON DEBTOR-CREDITOR 
RELATIONS 249 (1979); 37 AM. ]UR. 2D Fraudulent Conveyances §§ 1-279 (1968). 
115. Statute of Elizabeth and the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act; the latter has been 
adopted in twenty-six states. See W. HAWKLAND, supra note 114, at 249-59; AM. JUR., supra 
note 114, at§§ 3, 1S7-87; 7A U.L.A. 161 (1978). 
116. Should these remedies in fact not protect creditors sufficiently, fraudulent conveyance 
legislation should be reformed to be more effective. The broad, shotgun, approach of the 
necessaries doctrine is not an appropriate way to solve the problem. 
117. Jersey Shore Medical Center-Fitkin Hosp. v. Baum, 84 N.J. 137,151,417 A.2d 1003, 
1010 (1980). 
118. Forty-two of the states have separate marital property systems. The states that Jack 
such systems are Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico, Texas, and 
Washington - the co=unity property states. 
119. Jersey Shore Medical Center-Fitkin Hosp. v. Baum, 84 N.J. 137, ISi, 417 A.2d 1003, 
1010 ("A creditor providing necessaries to one spouse can assume that the financial resources 
of both spouses are available for payment."). 
120. Justice Abrahamson notes the similar effect of the Wisconsin rule in her dissent in 
Marshfield Clinic v. Discher, 105 Wis. 2d 506, 530-31, 314 N.W.2d 326, 338 (1982): 
The majority requires the homemaker to share in the family's liabilities but ... does not 
give the homemaker any share in the family's income or assets . • . . [T]o say that its rule 
benefits women, or benefits the needy spouse, or benefits the homemaker, or compensates 
for or ameliorates the effects of the existing disparate economic condition of men and 
women is Orwellian newspeak. 
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ship, is far better suited to making changes than individual 
adjudications. 
While the separate ownership of marital property should of its 
own force bar use of the business partnership analogy, there are also 
difficulties with the comparison itself. Marriage creates a unit that is 
composed of two individuals.121 The entity and the individuals often 
have contradictory interests which the law tries to reconcile. The old 
common law resolved this problem by declaring the primacy of the 
unit, and of the husband as its head. 122 The changed social position 
of women precludes that particular approach today. The New 
Jersey court, still eager to assert the importance of the unit, reached 
for the closest modem legal analogue - commercial partnerships. 
This comparison is superficially tempting because it embodies the 
notion of a cooperative community of individuals and because part-
ners pool their assets as do most spouses. 
On closer inspection, however, this analogy is unpersuasive. 
First, one wonders why the fact that most spouses voluntarily share 
with one another should be dispositive for their relationships with 
creditors. These private acts logically need not affect creditors' legal 
expectations. Furthermore, the simple existence of widespread mari-
tal sharing does not seem to be, by itself, a sufficient reason for le-
gally coercing universal spousal sharing.123 
Second, one doubts the appropriateness of the analogy. Marriage 
does provide important economic benefits, 124 but in our contempo-
rary culture its most widely recognized purposes are self-realization, 
personal growth, and achievement of happiness through an intimate 
relationship. 125 In contrast, the usual goal of partnership is profit. 126 
Moreover, partnership emphasizes the unit over the individual. This 
121. The Supreme Court recognized the unitary and individual aspects of marriage in the 
seminal privacy cases, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,486 (1965) ("Marriage is a com-
ing together .... "), and Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) ("[T]he marital couple 
is not an independent entity with a mind and heart of its own, but an association of two 
individuals each with a separate intellectual and emotional makeup."). 
122. See note 13 supra. 
123. For discussion of justifications of modem support laws, see notes 145-51 infra and 
accompanying text. 
124. See generally G. BECKER, supra note 13. See also Taub & Schneider, Perspectives on 
Women's Subordination and the Role of Law in D. KAIRYS, THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PRO-
GRESSIVE CRlTIQUE 117, 122 (1982). 
125. As Justice Douglas observed in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965): 
"[Marriage] is an association that promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in living, not 
political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects." 
126. The danger of fostering an economic attitude toward marriage is that the emotional 
component, the essence of marriage, is lost. A woman recently interviewed by pollster 
Yankelovich expressed it this way: 
It's as if we have this business partnership in the house and in our child and in our jobs. 
It's all right, I guess. But somehow there's a difference between a business partnership and 
marriage. There's definitely something wrong with this arrangement but I can't put my 
finger on what it is. 
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focus on the unit runs counter to a contemporary current of state, 127 
federal, 128 and constitutional 129 family law which increasingly recog• 
nizes the importance of the individual in marriage, and conflicts with 
modem expectations of individual choice in marriage. 
C. The State's Interests in the .Doctrine of Necessaries 
Two state interests have been proposed as justifications for the 
doctrine of necessaries: the conservation of public monies and the 
preservation of stable marriages. Given the structure of current wel• 
fare programs, the conservation of the public purse rationale130 is 
not convincing. Few government plans aimed solely at the allevia• 
tion of adult need (as opposed to social insurance programs, such as 
Social Security and Unemployment Compensation) provide for mar• 
ried people living together, 131 and of those that do, the income of 
both spouses is usually considered in determining eligibility. 132 
Thus, public funds will not likely be drawn upon in the situation the 
necessaries doctrine was intended to ameliorate: one spouse's refusal 
- not mere inability - to support the other. 
The preservation of stable marriages rationale is also questiona• 
ble. Children aside, the State champions marriage in the belief that 
this union promotes individual happiness and, by extension, social 
D. YANKELOVICH, NEW RULES: SEARCHING FOR SELF-FULFILLMENT IN A WORLD TURNED 
UPSIDE DOWN 21 (1981). 
127. For example, since the unity theory has been discredited husbands are no longer held 
responsible for their wives' torts and crimes. Cf. United States v. Dege, 364 U.S. 51 (1960) 
(Court rejected unity theory defense that a husband and wife are legally incapable of conspir-
ing with one another). 
128. An example of federal law recognizing the importance of the individual within mar-
riage is ECOA. See notes 60-76 supra and accompanying text. 
129. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) (Court held husband 
cannot veto his wife's decision to have an abortion.); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 
(1972) ("If the right of privacy means anything it is the right of the individual, married or 
single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion (in) ... the decision whether to 
bear or beget a child."). 
130. See, e.g., Krauskopf & Thomas, supra note 6, at 564. 
131. See, e.g., A. LA FRANCE, M. SCHROEDER, R. BENNETT, W. BOYD, LAW OF THE POOR 
282 (1973). 
132. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 23, § 6-1.2 (1981) (eligibility requirements for general 
assistance) ("Need. Income available to the person ..• including contributions from legally 
responsible relatives, must be insufficient .... ") (emphasis added); ILL. REV. STAT, ch. 23, 
§ 7-1.2 (1979) (eligibility for medical assistance) ("Need. The money, property, or other re-
sources available to the person, including support available from legally responsible relatives, 
must be insufficient to meet the cost of necessary care .... ") (emphasis added); ILL, REV, 
STAT. ch. 23, § 10-2 (1979) (extent of liability of legally responsible relatives) ("A husband is 
liable for the support of his wife, and a wife for the support of her husband .... In addition to 
the primary obligation of support imposed upon responsible relatives, ..• if [these relatives) 
have sufficient income or other resources to support a needy person, in whole or in part, [they] 
shall be liable for any financial aid extended under this Code to a person for whose support 
they are responsible .... "). 
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stability.133 Spousal support obligations, it is argued, benefit spouses 
and society by encouraging sharing and mutual support in mar-
riage.134 This behavior is thought to foster individual contentment 
which in tum promotes social harmony.135 The problem with apply-
ing this reasoning to the necessaries doctrine is that law cannot co-
erce these benefits; sharing produces cooperation and happiness only 
when it is voluntary.136 The necessaries doctrine forces sharing on 
reluctant partners and thus seems unlikely to promote the State's 
goal of marital happiness. 
D. Married Couples' Interest in Structuring Their Own Economic 
Relationships 
The doctrine of necessaries, by defining spouses' relationships 
with creditors, in effect establishes relatively inflexible marital eco-
nomic relationships. New Jersey, Indiana, Florida and Tennessee 
insist that each spouse provide financial support for the other.137 
Wisconsin does the same, but assigns primary responsibility to the 
husband.138 States still using the old doctrine leave all the legal obli-
gation on the male partner.139 Couples in these jurisdictions are not 
fully free, as they are in Maryland and Virginia where the neces-
saries doctrine has been abolished, 140 to decide which partner will 
provide financial support, or in what proportion each spouse will 
contribute support. 
Superficially, the interest that married people have in apportion-
ing support obligations for themselves may seem to be simply an 
133. See, e.g., DeBurgh v. DeBurgh, 39 Cal. 2d 858, 863-64, 250 P.2d 598, 601 (1952) (''The 
family is ... the center of the personal affections that ennoble and enrich human life .... [I]t 
nurtures and develops the individual initiative that distinguishes a free people. Since the fam-
ily is the core of our society, the law seeks to foster and preserve marriage."); Fearon v. 
Treanor, 272 N.Y. 268, 272-73, 5 N.E.2d 815, 816 (1936), appeal dismissed, 301 U.S. 667 (1937) 
("From time immemorial the State has exercised the fullest control over the marriage relation, 
justly believing that happy, successful marriages constitute the fundamental basis of the gen-
eral welfare of the people."); see also Schultz, supra note 7, at 313. 
134. See Blumberg, Cohabitation Without Marriage, A D!fferent Perspective, 28 UCLA L. 
REV. 1125 (1981), and Prager, Sharing Principles and the Future of Marital Property Law, 25 
UCLA L. REv. I (1977), for discussions of the importance of sharing to intimate relationships. 
135. Schultz, supra note 7, at 313. 
136. The problem of coercing cooperation in marriages is similar to that of coercing coop-
eration in the context of employment. Courts generally have refused to specifically enforce 
employment contracts on grounds that the law cannot coerce the benefits of an employment 
relationship when the parties refuse to cooperate voluntarily. See, e.g., H. W. Grossard Co. v. 
Crosby, 132 Iowa 155, 164, 109 N.W. 483, 486 (1906) ("If the relation of employer and em-
ployee is to be of value or profit to either it must be marked by some degree of mutual confi-
dence and satisfaction, and when these are gone and their places usurped by dislike and 
distrust, it is to the advantage of all concerned that their relations be severed."). 
137. See notes 26-36 supra and accompanying text. 
138. See notes 23-25 supra and accompanying text. 
139. See notes 12-22 supra and accompanying text. 
140. See notes 37-40 supra and accompanying text. 
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economic one. The implications of this decision, however, transcend 
family economics.141 The choice of support obligations affects the 
emotional character of the marital relationship and the internal 
power structure of the family. 142 Dependent/independent, interde-
pendent, or mutually independent spousal interactions reflect a 
couple's allocation of support responsibilities. 143 
Freedom to select support roles also permits self-definition ac-
cording to deep personal needs and beliefs. The self-image of one 
spouse may require that he cast himself primarily as a financial pro-
vider, while that of another may demand that he be a homemaker, 
and that of yet another may insist that he do a bit of both. In addi-
tion, married people have an interest, both as individuals and as a 
couple, in defining their public personae in keeping with these per-
sonal values. · 
The way in which married people apportion support responsibili-
ties expresses their values to their children as well. Parents both 
want and are obliged to instruct their offspring in the moral and so-
cial principles they believe are right. 144 Through the example of 
their marriage, parents teach their children about intimate relation-
ships and the appropriate social roles of men and women. Conse-
141. In contemporary marriages, assignment of support, housekeeping, and childcare tasks 
is increasingly likely to be determined by individual abilities and preferences, and to be tai-
lored to each family's needs, rather than decided by sex. F. NYE & F. BERARDO, THE FAMILY, 
ITS STRUCTURE AND INTERACTION 298 (1973). This alteration of responsibilities has been 
particularly dramatic with regard to family support. Between 1970 and 1980 dual-earner fami-
lies increased by 25% and in the same decade traditional-earner families declined from 44% to 
31 % of all families. May 1982 MONTHLY LAB. REV., supra note 24, at 55. The Supreme Court 
has taken official notice of these changes. The Court has noted that the " 'old notio[n]' that 
'generally it is the man's primary responsibility to provide a home and its essentials,' can no 
longer justify a statute that discriminates on the basis of gender. 'No longer is the female 
destined solely for the home and the rearing of the family, and only the male for the market• 
place and the world of ideas.'" Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 279-80 (1979) (citing Stanton v. 
Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 10, 14-15 (1975)). Three years later, in Wengler v. Druggists Mui. Ins. 
Co., 446 U.S. 142 (1980), Justice Stevens, in a concurring opinion, noted that there are now 
three types of support arrangements within marriage: "(!) those in which the husband is de-
pendent on the wife; (2) those in which the wife is dependent on the husband; and (3) those in 
which neither spouse is dependent on the other." 446 U.S. at 154. 
142. See F. NYE & F. BERARDO,supra note 141, at 304-05 ("pragmatic" power structure of 
the family affected by the wife's income). 
143. Traditional support roles tend to calcify gender-based economic roles. See Barrett, 
Obstacles lo Economic Parity far Women, 94 AM. ECON. ASSN., PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS 
160, 163 (1982) ("Economic gender roles in the traditional family ... perpetuate gender• 
based stereotypes and stereotypical self-images. The experience of distinct gender roles in 
families makes it difficult for persons who live in such families to accept androgyny in labor 
force roles."). 
144. See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503-04 (1977) ("[T]hrough the 
family . . . we inculcate and pass down many of our most cherished values, moral and cul-
tural.") (citation omitted); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510,535 (1925) ("[Parents] have 
the right, coupled with the high duty, to . . . prepare [their children] for additional 
obligations."). 
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quently, parents have a powerful interest in structuring their support 
obligations in accordance with their personal values. 
The necessaries doctrine's interference with couples' interests in 
determining their own support responsibilities might be justified if 
the doctrine provided meaningful support for necessitous spouses, 
gave creditors needed protection, or effectively promoted a legiti-
mate state interest. But, as this Note has demonstrated, it does not, 
and thus the doctrine should be abolished. 
Ill. THE MARITAL SUPPORT OBLIGATION AFTER ABOLITION OF 
THE DOCTRINE OF NECESSARIES 
Abolition of the necessaries doctrine renders the marital support 
obligation legally unenforceable between husband and wife. This 
unenf orceability does not, however, fully undermine the legitimate 
basis for and utility of a contemporary, gender-neutral support duty. 
A. The Normative Basis for Spousal Support Obligations. 
In the past, the economic justification for a spousal support duty 
was much more powerful than it is today. 145 The normative basis for 
the obligation, however, still retains great force. The premise here is 
that the consensus of our society was and still is that the "right" 
thing for spouses to do is to support one another. "Support" is used 
in the broadest sense, to mean material, spiritual, and emotional sus-
tenance. By this definition, the support obligation has always been 
reciprocal; but custom led the law to define and allocate the eco-
nomic aspects of the duty as financial responsibility for the male and 
homemaking for the female. 146 
The legal definition and allocation of support obligations in the 
present period of changing social roles for men and women is prob-
lematic. Formerly the State could assign marital support roles ac-
cording to widely-shared societal norms. Generally speaking, after 
the onset of industrialization, men were believed to belong in the 
workplace, women in the home. 147 This legal division of responsibil-
145. See note 13 supra and accompanying text. 
146. See note 12 supra and accompanying text. 
147. The upper and middle classes, thanks to a new industrial age prosperity, enjoyed a 
novel, rigid division of nonproductive home and productive workworld in the latter half of the 
nineteenth century. Women and children were assigned to the former, men to the latter. See, 
e.g., N. BASCH, supra note 12, at 40 ("As industrial capitalism pushed production out of the 
home in the first half of the nineteenth century, emphasis on the wife's special role was intensi-
fied, sentimentalized, and transformed into the cult of domesticity. Women, as wives and 
mothers, occupied a lofty sphere that was complementary to but clearly separate from the 
world of men."); C. DEGLER, AT Ooos: WOMEN AND THE FAMILY IN AMERICA FROM THE 
REVOLUTION TO THE PRESENT 26 (1980) ("Women's activities were increasingly confined to 
the care of the children, the nurturing of husband, and the physical maintenance of the 
home. . . . Husbands . . . were active outside the home, at their work, in politics, and in the 
world in general."). 
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ities was reinforced by major social institutions, in particular, 
church, community, and extended family. 148 Today though, there is 
no "homogeneous definition" of proper male and female roles from 
which the State may draw its moral authority to structure its citizens' 
intimate relationships. 149 Nor can the State claim to know what sys-
tem of ordering is best for individual families and for society. While 
such a claim may have been valid when the traditional, single-earner 
family predominated, it is of questionable significance today. 150 
Given the current absence of consensus regarding correct marital 
roles, the most reasonable solution is to make the legal duty to sup-
port a nonspecific one. The duty would consist of a generalized ex-
hortation to spouses to support one another financially and 
emotionally, and would leave to individual couples the definition 
and allocation of specific support duties within their marriages. 151 
To avoid state-ordering of the marital relationship, the duty must be 
unenforceable. 152 
B. Legitimacy of a Nonenforceable Support .Duty 
Many commentators have argued that nonenforcement under-
mines a law's legitimacy. 153 Some scholars, however, have recog-
nized that at least some kinds of unenforced laws serve symbolic 
functions. According to one legal theorist, these symbolic laws de-
pend for effect on public affirmation of norms rather than on en-
forcement. 154 People obey symbolic laws not for fear of legal 
sanction, but because they are backed by the consensus of society 
and the force of major social institutions. 155 This symbolic or in-
structional effect of law is probably strongest in areas of traditional 
morality, such as prohibitions against murder, 156 and exhortations to 
family support. 
148. Schultz, supra note 7, at 313. 
149. D. YANKELOVICH, supra note 126, at 87; see also Schultz, supra note 7, at 313. 
150. See May 1982 MONTHLY LAB. REV., supra note 24, at 55 (Between 1970-1980 dual 
earner families increased by 25% and traditional-earner families - those in which the hus-
band, but not the wife, was'an earner - declined from 44% to 31% of all families.). But see 
note 42supra for data indicating that many wives are still totally dependent on their husbands 
economically. 
151. See notes 141-44supra and accompanying text. 
152. Private-ordering of marital support duties could be enforced if contracts between 
spouses were legally enforceable. For discussions of the benefits and problems associated with 
marital contracts, see, e.g., L. WEITZMAN, supra note 6, Krauskopf & Thomas, supra note 6; 
Schultz, supra note 7. 
153. See, e.g., L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 77, at 95. 
154. Gusfield,Moral Passage: The Symbolic Passage in Public .Designations of .Deviance, 15 
Soc. PRODS. 175, 176-79 (1967). 
155. Gusfield, supra note 154, at 176-79; see also L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 11, at 51. 
156. See, e.g., L. FRIEDMAN,supra note 77, at 123; Wilkinson & White, Conslilulional Pro• 
leclionfar Personal Lifestyles, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 563, 568 (1977). 
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According to this system of analysis, legal endorsement of 
spousal support has a real, if unmeasurable, impact on spousal be-
havior. This conclusion comports with what is known about marital 
support behavior. 157 No one contends that the threat of liability 
under the necessaries doctrine motivates spouses to provide for one 
another. Surely only a very few spouses know that it exists. Couples 
support each other out of affection and bec~use the law, among other 
sources of normative values, tells them it is the right thing to do. 158 
Thus, an unenforceable duty would still encourage spousal support, 
and would do so without interfering with couples' interests in defin-
ing and allocating their own support duties. 
CONCLUSION 
Marriage and society have changed greatly since the necessaries 
doctrine was first formulated. Neither the doctrine's practical effects, 
nor its underlying premises, justify its perpetuation or modification. 
It is generally an ineffective means of providing spousal support, and 
furthermore, there is no persuasive evidence that the doctrine is use-
ful in the context of the narrow support problem it was intended to 
alleviate. Creditors are already adequately protected from married 
debtors, and the State's interests in protecting public funds and pro-
moting stable marriages are not served by the doctrine. Finally, 
couples have a significant interest in determining their own support 
arrangements, an interest that outweighs any residual value the doc-
trine may have. Consequently, this Note recommends that the doc-
trine of necessaries be declared "unnecessary." 
157. See note 89 supra. 
158. See, e.g., L. KANOWITZ, supra note 12, at 71. 
